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Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*  
The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have frequently insisted 
that “facial challenges” to the validity of statutes are and ought to be 
rare. Based partly on an empirical survey of all cases decided by the 
Court during six selected Terms, this Article reveals that assumption 
to be empirically false and normatively mistaken. Error on this point 
reflects broader confusions and misunderstandings. For example, it 
is not true that only a few especially stringent constitutional tests 
frame facial challenges. Even the rational basis test sometimes yields 
the conclusion that statutes are invalid in toto. The conventional 
wisdom also errs in positing that the Supreme Court can cure a 
statute’s facial defects merely by invoking a general “presumption of 
severability” under which, in a future case, any of a statute’s invalid 
applications can be separated from valid ones. 
Besides revising the conventional wisdom about facial 
challenges, this Article locates the root of misunderstanding in the 
rhetoric of a relatively small number of much-cited cases. It also 
begins the reconstructive task of explaining when facial challenges 
do and do not succeed. That explanation has three parts. First, there 
is a crucial linkage between rulings of facial invalidity and the 
breadth of the reasons that the Supreme Court gives in upholding 
constitutional challenges. Second, the Court is often inattentive to 
severability issues, and its practice must be understood accordingly. 
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Although this Article advances important rationalizing 
generalizations, it explains why the Court’s approach to severability 
cannot be captured in rigid rules. Third, many Supreme Court 
decisions rejecting facial challenges are best understood as finding 
facial challenges to be unripe, rather than categorically unavailable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of when statutes should be subject to “facial” rather than to 
“as-applied” challenges is currently a subject of hot debate, both in the 
Supreme Court and among commentators.
1 Especially in the years since John 
Roberts became Chief Justice, High Court opinions have often displayed an 
acute self-consciousness about the distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges.
2 The Justices have lectured not only the lower courts, but also each 
other, about when facial challenges are and are not appropriate.
3 Without 
exception, the lectures rest on the assumption that facial challenges are and 
ought to be rare. 
That assumption is false as an empirical matter and highly dubious as a 
normative proposition. What is more, misunderstanding on this point reflects 
more general myopia and confusion with respect to facial challenges in the 
Supreme Court, perhaps most especially, but by no means exclusively, among 
the Justices themselves. Nearly across the board, the conventional wisdom 
regarding facial challenges—some of which I have myself endorsed in prior 
writing
4—is more wrong than right. It errs with respect to at least four 
important points. 
First, as I have asserted already, facial challenges to statutes are common, 
not anomalous.
5 To provide one measure of the frequency of facial challenges, 
my research assistants and I examined every case decided by the Supreme 
 
1. For recent scholarly discussions, see, for example, Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and 
the Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557 (2010); Gillian Metzger, Facial and As-Applied 
Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 798 (2009); Nathaniel Persily 
& Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of 
As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1644 (2009); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1209, 1273–79 (2010); Symposium, The Roberts Court: Distinguishing As-Applied Versus Facial 
Challenges, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563 (2009); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738 (2010). 
2. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892–96 (2010); 
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008); Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156–68 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 
320, 328–31 (2006). 
3. Compare  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892–96 (asserting the appropriateness of 
entertaining a facial challenge to a statute regulating political speech) (majority opinion) with id. 
at 932–38 (maintaining that challengers had only presented, and the Court should only address, an 
as-applied challenge) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). 
5. But see Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450 (“[F]acial challenges are disfavored.”); 
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (“recalling that facial challenges are best when 
infrequent”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 163 (6th 
ed. 2009) (referring to “the Court’s characteristic refusal to adjudicate facial challenges”) 
[hereinafter HART  &  WECHSLER]; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1644 (noting the 
Supreme Court’s “strong preference for as-applied challenges” in various contexts). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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Court in the 2009, 2004, 1999, 1994, 1989, and 1984 Terms.
6 In all of those 
Terms, the Court adjudicated more facial challenges on the merits than it did 
as-applied challenges. Another, equally convincing measure of the frequency of 
facial challenges emerges from an informal survey of leading Supreme Court 
cases establishing and applying doctrinal tests,
7 many if not most of which 
direct attention to a statute on its face, not as applied. Consider, for example, 
the test applied to invalidate an affirmative action program in City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co.
8 By the Court’s own analysis, the City of Richmond could 
have awarded preferences to identified victims of past racial discrimination.
9 
Yet the Court’s test assessed the constitutionality of the program on its face, not 
as-applied, and produced the conclusion that the program was invalid.
10 
Similar determinations of facial invalidity have occurred, frequently 
without comment, in cases from Brown v. Board of Education
11 under the 
Equal Protection Clause to Brandenburg v. Ohio
12 under the First Amendment 
to  United States v. Lopez
13 under the Commerce Clause. Although some 
commentators have correctly noted that facial challenges succeed more often 
than the Justices appear to grasp,
14 even critical writers have mostly failed to 
gauge the extent to which facial challenges predominate over as-applied 
challenges on the Court’s docket. Facial challenges also succeed much more 
frequently than either Supreme Court Justices or most scholarly commentators 
have recognized.
15 In the Terms that my research assistants and I surveyed, we 
found a 44 percent success rate for facial challenges, compared with 38 percent 
for as-applied challenges. 
 
  6. See infra Part III.B. 
  7. See infra Part III.A. 
  8. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
  9. See id. at 509 (noting the City’s capacity to provide remedies for identified 
discrimination); id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring) (affirming that the Constitution permits remedial 
action to give victims of past discrimination what was wrongfully denied to them). 
10. See id. at 511. 
11. 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
12. 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). 
13. 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995). 
14. See, e.g., Marc Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid 
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 439 (1998) (reporting that “the doctrinal tests that 
constitute the main part of constitutional adjudication” make facial challenges “more readily 
available than the Court, when invoking the indispensability of facts, might otherwise admit”); 
Michael Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238 (1994) 
(asserting that the principle laid out by the Supreme Court in Salerno as a limit on facial 
challenges “is wrong” because “[i]t neither accurately reflects the Court’s practice” nor is 
“consistent with a wide array of legal practices”). 
15. See infra Part III.A. To say that facial challenges frequently succeed is not, however, to 
say, as Professor Adler does, that “[t]here is no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional 
challenge” or that “every constitutional challenge involves the validity of rules.” Matthew D. 
Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 157 (1998) (emphasis omitted). See Fallon, supra note 4, at 1328–36, 1264–68 
(responding to Adler’s claims). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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Second, again contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court 
does not routinely insist on ruling on as-applied challenges before deciding 
whether to hold a statute invalid on its face, nor should it almost always do so.
16 
Third, contrary to the conventional wisdom once more, it is not the case 
that only a few stringent and anomalous constitutional tests frame facial 
challenges, nor that most constitutional tests measure the validity of statutes 
only as applied to particular cases.
17 To cite just one example, the rational basis 
test, generally thought to be lax in the extreme,
18 sometimes yields the 
conclusion that statutes are invalid in toto because, on their faces, they are not 
rationally related to any legitimate state interest.
19 It is undoubtedly difficult to 
show that a statute is irrational. Nevertheless, applications of the rational basis 
test typically focus on whether statutes, rather than applications of statutes, are 
rational or irrational. 
Fourth, and yet again in the teeth of conventional wisdom, the Supreme 
Court cannot cure a statute’s asserted irrationality or rectify any other defect 
identified by a test of constitutional validity by merely invoking a so-called 
“presumption of severability,” generically positing that, when the time comes, 
invalid applications can be separated from valid ones.
20 Instead, a court 
confronted with the argument that a statute is invalid under a doctrinal test of 
statutory validity—regardless of whether the test demands a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest, requires narrow tailoring to a 
compelling interest, or states other validity conditions—generally will and 
 
16. See infra Part III.C.2. But see Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 
320, 329 (2006) (“[T]he ‘normal rule’ is . . . that a ‘statute may . . . be declared invalid to the 
extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.’”) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985)) (second omission in original). 
17. See infra Part III.C.3. But see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 181 (summarizing 
the view that apart from the distinctive attributes of “some doctrinal tests, including the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine and tests that inquire whether statutes are narrowly tailored to 
promote compelling governmental interests”—which limit statutory severability—“[t]he 
ordinarily applicable presumption that statutes are ‘severable’” renders them immune from facial 
invalidation on the ground that they have some invalid applications); Metzger, supra note 1, at 
791 n.77 (linking the success or failure of facial challenges to “substantive constitutional law” and 
asserting that “instances in which measures are unconstitutional in their entirety, and their 
unconstitutionality is not curable through severance, are relatively (and appropriately) rare”). 
Much closer to the truth is Isserles, supra note 14, at 439 (recognizing that many doctrinal tests 
invite facial challenges). 
18. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (“This standard of 
review is a paradigm of judicial restraint.”). 
19. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (finding that a New 
Mexico statute affording tax exemptions to some veterans but not others failed rational basis 
scrutiny). 
20. See infra Part III.B.4. But see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 162 (characterizing 
“the premise that statutes are typically ‘separable’ or ‘severable’ and that invalid applications can 
somehow be severed from valid applications” as “deeply rooted in American constitutional law”); 
Dorf, supra note 14, at 250–51 (discussing “the presumption of severability”); Metzger, supra 
note 1, at 791–92 & n.77 (emphasizing the importance of severability in defeating most facial 
challenges). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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always should anticipate more specifically how the statute could be severed in 
order to satisfy that test. 
The truth regarding all of these matters has been hiding in plain sight, 
visible for all to see in the pages of the United States Reports. Yet, remarkably, 
the Supreme Court recurrently recites the contrary with respect to all of them, 
and even the revisionist articles that have got matters most nearly right in some 
respects have either failed to challenge conventional fallacies or gone badly 
astray in others. Mea culpa.
21 Among my goals in this Article is to explain how 
error could have spread so widely. 
In seeking to dispel some of the myriad confusions that have grown up 
around the topic of facial challenges, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
addresses some preliminary definitional matters. The terms “as-applied 
challenge” and “facial challenge” are both potentially ambiguous; the contrast 
between them cannot be as sharp as is often imagined. Nonetheless, the debate 
about the propriety of facial challenges generally assumes such challenges to be 
ones that, if accepted, would establish that a statute has no valid applications 
whatsoever. Under this definition, which Part I accepts, all other challenges—
including those the acceptance of which would imply a statute’s partial 
invalidity—constitute as-applied challenges. 
Part II sketches the foundations of the conventional views that facial 
challenges are rarely permitted and that they succeed even more infrequently. 
Part II.A examines the central, frequently cited, and much-quoted cases that 
courts and many commentators point to as establishing the conventional 
wisdom. Part II.B discusses a few recent Supreme Court decisions that reaffirm 
this view.   
Part III demonstrates that the conventional wisdom, despite being 
supported by the cases discussed in Part II, errs in nearly all of its particulars. 
To establish this conclusion, Part III.A offers a partial catalogue of successful 
facial challenges in the Supreme Court. That catalogue is lengthy, 
encompassing cases arising under myriad constitutional provisions and 
numerous tests of constitutional validity. It suggests that facial challenges 
constitute the norm, not the anomaly, in constitutional litigation before the 
Supreme Court in which the validity of statutes and their applications is at 
issue. Part III.B corroborates that conclusion by presenting the results of a 
survey of all Supreme Court cases decided during six Terms spaced at five-year 
intervals from the most recent Term back to 1984. Although categorization of 
cases presenting facial challenges, as-applied challenges, or neither is a 
judgment-laden exercise—for reasons laid out in an Appendix—my tally 
 
21. I have written about facial challenges before without challenging the tenets of the 
conventional wisdom described in the text, in Fallon, supra note 4, and in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991). Apart from this confessed error, I 
otherwise stand by the main elements of my earlier analyses. I shall not, however, attempt a 
systematic synthesis in this Article. 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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indicates that the Court not only adjudicated more facial challenges than as-
applied challenges during all six Terms, but also that facial challenges had a 
higher overall success rate. Part III.C completes the demolition of the 
conventional wisdom by explaining how particular cases and doctrines 
specifically refute the conventional wisdom’s central, defining premises. 
Part IV takes up the reconstructive task of making sense of the Supreme 
Court’s pattern of responses to facial challenges. There is a close link, Part IV 
argues, between the breadth of the Supreme Court’s articulated rationales for 
decision in constitutional cases—including the rationales furnished by well-
known tests of constitutional validity—and holdings or implications of facial 
invalidity. Sometimes the Court shrinks from rationales that would imply that 
statutes are invalid on their faces. When it does so, it tends to condemn facial 
challenges in general terms. But sometimes the Court, appropriately, utters 
broad holdings that reflect determinations of facial invalidity. To take just the 
most familiar and uncontroversial examples, when the Supreme Court says that 
racially separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,
22 it not only holds 
that the challenged statutes mandating segregation in the case before it are 
facially unconstitutional, but also provides a basis for future holdings that all 
statutes that mandate racial separation are unconstitutional on their faces. When 
the Court says that a statute regulating speech cannot be enforced because it 
discriminates on the basis of content or point of view when doing so is not 
necessary to promote a compelling interest, it achieves a similar effect.
23 In 
articulating and applying rules such as these, the Court frequently upholds 
facial challenges without even pausing to observe that it is doing so. The 
crucial first step to understanding facial challenges is to go beyond explicit 
judicial references to facial and as-applied litigation and to grasp the signi-
ficance of the Court’s articulated reasons for upholding constitutional claims. 
As noted above, courts and commentators have often assumed that, absent 
express declarations of facial invalidity, a so-called “presumption of 
severability” normally permits the separation of a statute’s invalid applications 
from its valid ones and thus blocks judgments of total statutory invalidity.
24 As 
 
22. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).  
24. On severability, see, e.g., David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 639 (2008); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993); 
Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 
76 (1937); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO.  L.J. 1945 (1997). Severability 
doctrine can be understood as having two components. One applies to separately denominated 
statutory provisions or linguistically distinctive bits of statutory text; it addresses the feasibility 
and propriety of enforcing the remaining portions of a statute after other textually identifiable 
portions have been deemed constitutionally invalid. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 5, at 163. A 
second component of severability doctrine involves the severing of invalid applications of a 
single, otherwise undifferentiated textual provision. See id. “[C]ourts and commentators have for 
the most part treated severance of invalid statutory provisions and severance of invalid 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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Part IV shows, however, it is a mistake to believe that there is a single, 
generally applicable presumption of severability. To say this is not to say—as a 
few commentators have suggested—that severability analysis is relatively 
unimportant in determining when facial challenges can succeed.
25 The problem, 
instead, is that the Court’s practices in treating severability as a bar to 
declarations of facial invalidity fail to conform to consistent rules. At best, one 
can offer generalizations about when the Court tends to treat statutes as 
severable and when it does not.   
Humble though it is, this conclusion provides the foundation for a broad 
rethinking and recharacterization of the Court’s approach to severability issues.  
Without claiming to have adduced invariant rules of practice, Part IV advances 
five generalizations concerning Supreme Court propensities to presume statutes 
severable or inseverable. Taken in conjunction, these generalizations help to 
explain both why the Court rejected facial challenges in the cases that are 
recurrently cited as establishing the conventional wisdom and why it very 
frequently, albeit typically less self-consciously, upholds facial challenges in 
other cases. Part IV also demonstrates that ripeness doctrine, rather than invari-
able rules barring facial challenges, provides the best explanation for prominent 
cases in which the Court has rebuffed facial challenges on the ground that they 
call for “premature” determinations of statutes’ meaning and validity. 
Part V, which surveys some familiar normative arguments for barring 
facial challenges, serves as a brief conclusion. It demonstrates that arguments 
attempting to prove the categorical undesirability of facial challenges mistake 
what is true in some cases for what is true in most or even all cases. 
I. 
DEFINING AS-APPLIED AND FACIAL CHALLENGES: AMBIGUITIES AT THE 
THRESHOLD 
Confusion about facial and as-applied challenges begins with the 
terminology itself. Although facial and as-applied challenges are invariably 
contrasted with one another, the meaning of both terms is elusive. Moreover, 
even insofar as reasonable precision of definition can be achieved, the contrast 
is not nearly so stark as is often supposed. 
 
 
applications of a particular statutory provision as governed by similar principles.” Vermeule, 
supra, at 1950 n.26. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 873, 886 (2005) (noting that severability of statutory applications is governed by the same 
principles as the separation of invalid statutory provisions). I have previously conceptualized the 
severance of applications as the functional equivalent of hypothesized statutory “sub-rules” that an 
actual statutory text may be imagined as subsuming. For discussion, see infra note 49 and 
associated text. 
25. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 1, at 1579 (pointing to “[t]he mistake by modern scholars in 
placing so much emphasis on severability”). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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As I have explained previously,
26 the root of the confusion lies in the 
American style of judicial review, which locates the determination of 
constitutional claims in concrete disputes between parties with adverse 
interests.
27 Within this framework, all constitutional challenges to a rule of 
law—whether denominated as as-applied or as facial—begin with a challenger 
who maintains that the Constitution forbids the enforcement of that rule against 
her.
28 In this sense, all challenges are as-applied challenges.  
To make sense of the nearly ubiquitous assumption that all challenges to 
the validity or enforceability of statutes are either facial or as-applied, and that 
these categories are mutually exclusive of one another, we therefore need to 
attend to the senses in which the terms are more commonly understood. For the 
most part, both courts and commentators have tended to adopt a definition of 
facial challenges as ones seeking to have a statute declared unconstitutional in 
all possible applications.
29 As-applied challenges are then treated as the 
residual, although ostensibly preferred and larger, category. Though other 
definitions would be possible,
30 the currently prevailing ones are sufficiently 
clear and well accepted that I see no reason to resist them with respect to cases 
decided by the Supreme Court.
31   
 
26. See Fallon, supra note 4, at 1324. 
27. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 58–80 (surveying the history and rationale of 
American practice and contrasting it with a “European model” in which “constitutional courts” 
decide abstract questions framed by political authorities to determine the constitutionality of a law 
before it goes into effect). 
28. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 239, 294; Fallon, supra note 4, at 1326, 1339. 
29. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004); United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974); Metzger, supra note 
24, at 882 (“The net effect of the current Salerno approach is that facial challenges now operate 
solely at the wholesale level, encompassing only across-the-board claims of unconstitutionality.”); 
Kevin C. Walsh, Frames of Reference and the “Turn to Remedy” in Facial Challenge Doctrine, 
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 667, 667 (2009). 
30. In the past, both the Court and commentators applied the label “facial” when the party 
challenging a statute “put[] into issue an explicit rule of law, as formulated by the legislature or [a 
lower] court, and” based her claim of unconstitutionality on the facts of her own case “only 
insofar as it is necessary to establish that the rule served as a basis for decision.” PAUL M. BATOR, 
DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 662 (3d ed. 1988). Some recent commentators have also endorsed this 
definition. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 24, at 881–82; Isserles, supra note 14, at 423.    
31. When a court pronounces a statute facially invalid, the force of its holding inheres 
entirely in the doctrines of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and precedent as well as in the 
scope of any injunction that the court issues to enforce its judgment. See Fallon, supra note 4, at 
1339–40. In the case of the Supreme Court, the doctrine of precedent is especially important, 
because the Court’s precedents on issues of federal law bind all inferior courts. See, e.g., State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 
(1994); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). By 
contrast, imagine that Congress enacts a statute forbidding a particular abortion technique and that 
Dr. Spock, a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, successfully sues in federal district court in 
Massachusetts for a declaratory judgment that the statute is invalid “on its face.” Imagine further 
that the First Circuit affirms and that the Supreme Court denies certiorari. Under the doctrine of 
issue preclusion, Spock cannot be prosecuted for violating the statute. See R ESTATEMENT 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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In following common practice, however, I should point out a cost. When 
the term “as-applied challenge” is treated as a residual category, encompassing 
every challenge to a statute or its applications that does not seek a holding of 
total, facial invalidity, terminological imprecision inevitably follows. It does so 
because when a challenger asks a court to hold a statute invalid in fewer than 
all applications, there can be a considerable range of choice about just how 
broadly a ruling of partial invalidity might sweep. To see why, it will be useful 
to distinguish among the kinds of reasons that a challenger might assert in 
support of her claim that a statute cannot be applied to her. At one end of the 
spectrum, she might advance reasons so specifically tied to the facts of her case 
as to be unique, or nearly unique, to her circumstances. For example, imagine a 
criminal defendant who challenges a statute prescribing life in prison without 
parole as the mandatory penalty for possessing an ounce or more of marijuana 
and who asserts that the statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to 
her because she: (1) was only one day over the age of sixteen at the time of the 
crime, (2) otherwise had no criminal record, (3) was an honor student, (4) had 
been abused by her parents as a child, and (5) purchased the marijuana at the 
request of and for her father, who gave her the money to do so.
32 A judicial 
ruling holding the mandatory sentencing statute unconstitutional as applied to 
these facts would be a nearly purely as-applied ruling. 
 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a 
different claim.”). Under the doctrine of precedent, district courts in the First Circuit would also 
need to dismiss prosecutions against other doctors. But doctors in other circuits would remain 
subject to prosecution. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“[N]either 
declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or 
ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs.”). Doctors who had not been 
parties to the case could not invoke the doctrines of claim or issue preclusion, and although the 
First Circuit’s ruling might have persuasive authority, it would not bind other circuits. See Jeffrey 
C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH  L.  REV. 1453, 1463 (2010) (reviewing “the 
standard model of precedent,” under which “the bindingness of a prior decision turns most clearly 
on whether that prior decision was issued by a court with the power of appellate (or discretionary) 
review over the court deciding a subsequent case.”); Fallon, supra note 4, at 1340. In short, 
although the First Circuit might have pronounced the federal statute “facially invalid,” the binding 
force of that judgment would not extend into other jurisdictions. If the federal judgment of facial 
invalidity occurred in a class action on behalf of all doctors practicing medicine in the state, it 
could, of course, bar all prosecutions under the statute. But this result would depend, once again, 
on the sweep and force of the federal injunction and on the doctrine of issue preclusion, not on any 
talismanic force inhering in the terms “facial challenge” or “facial invalidity.” Because the term 
“facial challenge” tends to obscure issues involving the precedential and preclusive effects of 
lower court judgments and the appropriate scope of judicial injunctions, we would do better to 
drop the term “facial challenge” entirely when talking about lower court rulings. It would much 
enhance the clarity of the analysis to speak instead about broad and narrow judicial rulings, about 
the claim and issue preclusive effects of lower court judgments, and about the certification and 
noncertification of class actions in cases challenging statutes or their applications. 
32. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (holding that offenders under 
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Typically, however, the extent to which a ruling is as-applied to particular 
facts will be a matter of degree. Above I imagined a criminal defendant 
contesting the application of a mandatory sentencing statute against her based 
on a bevy of considerations. Appraising the arguments, a court might agree that 
the Constitution bars enforcement of the statute against the defendant, but 
based on one factor alone. It might hold, for example, that a statute mandating 
sentences of life in prison is unconstitutional as applied to defendants of less 
than eighteen years of age.
33 This holding would be less purely as-applied than 
one that made more facts pertinent, but more nearly purely as-applied than one 
holding the statute invalid in all its applications. 
From time to time the Supreme Court notices that some as-applied 
challenges seek relatively broad statutory invalidations and puzzles about how 
to categorize them.
34 But I shall not, here, embark on a discussion of how the 
Court might make its terminology more precise. Without wishing to overstate 
the Court’s consistency on this point, I shall, unless otherwise indicated, follow 
the Court’s more usual pattern of employing the as-applied label to refer to any 
challenge that does not seek to establish that a statute is totally invalid.   
A final definitional word may also be in order about what rules of law, 
exactly, are subject to as-applied or facial challenges. The terms apply most 
straightforwardly to attacks on statutes and administrative regulations, but can 
also extend to other written policies and to clearly delineated common law 
rules.
35 In cases involving statutes and rules, it is important to recognize, too, 
that the Supreme Court routinely speaks of facial attacks on particular 
provisions or sections of legislative acts, even when the success of those attacks 
could leave other aspects of multipart enactments intact.
36 Unless otherwise 
specifically indicated, I shall use the term in the same way, as comprising 
challenges to all applications of any linguistically distinguishable part or 
subpart of a more comprehensive statute or rule. In other words, attacks on the 
validity of subparts of a statute count as facial attacks on those subparts. 
 
 
 
33. See id. 
34. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2816–18 (2010). 
35. For slightly fuller specification of the scheme of categorization that I employed in 
counting facial and as-applied challenges from a selection of Supreme Court Terms, see infra 
notes 321–334 and accompanying text. 
36. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892–96 (2010) 
(sustaining a “facial challenge” to Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
but not questioning the validity of other parts of the Act); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (finding a single provision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act 
that required married women to notify their husbands before obtaining abortions unless specified 
exceptions applied to be facially invalid); David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative 
Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 53 n.55 (2006) (observing that a facial 
challenge can be directed at only one provision of a statute). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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II. 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONVENTIONAL BUT FALLACIOUS UNDERSTANDING 
In the Introduction, I maintained that the conventional wisdom about the 
availability of facial challenges errs seriously. But the conventional wisdom 
could not have achieved conventional status if it had nothing to support it. 
Supreme Court holdings or dicta in a number of much-cited cases undergird the 
widely held beliefs that facial challenges are rarely entertained and almost 
never succeed, that courts typically rule on as-applied challenges before 
addressing facial challenges, that only a few constitutional tests license facial 
challenges, and that a “presumption of severability” almost always precludes 
facial challenges. As I shall demonstrate in Part III, the error lies in believing 
that the much-quoted but highly over-generalized rhetoric of a relatively few 
cases accurately depicts the Court’s ordinary practice. 
This Part—which serves as a prelude both to that demonstration and to 
Part IV’s attempt to give a more accurate account of when facial challenges 
succeed and fail—first describes four important cases supporting the 
conventional wisdom. It then discusses some prominent, recent cases in which 
the Supreme Court has appeared to embrace the conventional wisdom’s 
normative prescriptions. Although much of the rhetoric in the cases discussed 
in this Part is deeply misleading, almost all of the holdings can be fit into a 
pattern, to be sketched in Part IV, in which facial challenges can almost always 
be brought and in which they succeed with remarkably little-noticed frequency. 
A. Foundations of the Conventional Wisdom 
Four Supreme Court cases either lay the foundations for or otherwise 
illustrate the conventional wisdom about facial challenges.
37 
1. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Jackson Vinegar Co. 
The central pillar of the conventional understanding that facial challenges 
are anomalous and disfavored, that most familiar tests of constitutional validity 
do not license them, and that a presumption of severability explains how facial 
challenges can be readily dismissed is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. 
Jackson Vinegar Co.
38 The Yazoo case, which has served as the Hart & 
Wechsler Federal Courts casebook’s principal case on facial and as-applied 
challenges since the book’s first edition in 1953,
39 arose under a Mississippi 
statute that required common carriers doing business in the state to “settle all 
claims” of less than $200 for “freight which has been lost or damaged between 
 
37. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 
491 (1985); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson 
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912).  
38. 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
39. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
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two given points on the same line or system” within a period of sixty days or “be 
liable to the consignee for twenty-five dollars damages . . . in addition to actual 
damages, all of which may be recovered in the same suit.”
40 The Yazoo and 
Mississippi Valley Railroad lost or damaged freight belonging to the Jackson 
Vinegar Co., which notified the railroad of damages in the amount of $4.76.
41 
When the railroad failed to settle the claim within sixty days, a Mississippi state 
court awarded the vinegar company $4.76 in actual damages, plus the statutorily 
prescribed $25 penalty.
42 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the railroad 
appears to have conceded its liability for $4.76, but argued that the statute 
penalizing it for failing to settle the claim violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, because, the railroad maintained, it would unfairly penalize 
the litigation of doubtful or excessive claims in other cases.
43 
The Supreme Court rebuffed the railroad’s argument that the statute was 
facially invalid. Because the statute was constitutional as applied to the case 
before it involving a valid claim, the Court reasoned that it need not, and should 
not, say any more: 
Of course, the argument [that the Court must determine whether the 
statute would be valid as applied to other cases] is that, if [it] embraces 
cases such as are supposed, it is void as to them, and, if so void, is void 
in toto. But this court must deal with the case in hand and not with 
imaginary ones. It suffices, therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases 
like the present, the statute is valid. How the state court may apply it to 
other cases, whether its general words may be treated as more or less 
restrained, and how far other parts of it may be sustained if others fail 
are matters upon which we need not speculate now.
44 
Although commentators have overwhelmingly applauded the result in Yazoo, 
and embraced it as characteristic of a judicial practice of generally refusing 
even to consider facial challenges that depend on a statute’s application to other 
cases, they have not approved the Court’s stated reasoning.
45 The point of 
discomfiture has involved the Court’s dismissal of the argument that a statute 
that is void as to some cases should therefore be considered void in toto. Under 
what Henry Monaghan has dubbed “the valid rule requirement,”
46 the Yazoo 
 
40. 226 U.S. at 218. 
41. Id. at 219. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 219–20. 
45. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 181–82 (5th ed. 2003) 
(querying whether the Supreme Court should have inquired into the separability of the challenged 
statute before rejecting a facial challenge) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER’S 5TH EDITION]; Dorf, 
supra note 14, at 243. 
46. See  Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP.  CT.  REV. 1, 3 [hereinafter 
Monaghan, Overbreadth]; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 195 (considering whether harmless error practice violates the 
valid rule requirement). Adler, supra note 15, at 160, denies the existence of a valid rule 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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and Mississippi Valley Railroad could not lawfully be held liable to the Jackson 
Vinegar Co. unless some constitutionally valid rule of law made it liable. If so, 
however, it would seem to follow that the Supreme Court should have felt 
obliged to address the argument that the statute before it failed the “valid rule” 
test by being “void” as to some cases and therefore void in toto. 
Although agreeing that this argument requires a response, commentators 
have joined nearly unanimously in positing one, typically characterized as a 
“presumption of severability,”
47 under which any invalid statutory applications 
could presumptively have been severed from the valid ones, with the latter 
reflecting the constitutionally requisite valid rule.
48 In order to account for how 
the severing of invalid applications could accord with the valid rule 
requirement, I have previously suggested that statutory rules might be thought 
of as comprising a number of “subrules,” the severing of one or more of which 
would leave other, valid subrules intact.
49  Yazoo illustrates the proposed 
analytical framework: 
[T]he Court assumes that the statutory requirement that the railroad 
settle “all claims” should be viewed as potentially encompassing 
multiple sub-rules, including the sub-rule “(i) settle all valid and non-
exorbitant claims,” as well as possible further sub-rules such as “(ii) 
settle all frivolous and excessive claims.” If the statute is viewed as 
comprising a number of sub-rules, it becomes comprehensible that 
sub-rule (i) could survive even if sub-rule (ii) were constitutionally 
invalid and had to be severed.
50 
2. United States v. Raines 
The Supreme Court came a step closer to expressing reliance on the 
presumption of severability in a second much-cited case that also dismissed a 
facial challenge, United States v. Raines.
51 Raines was a civil rights action, 
brought by the government to enjoin the defendant state election registrars from 
discriminating against African Americans.
52 The central issue involved the 
validity of the statute that authorized the government to sue.
53 Congress had 
 
requirement, but in my view unpersuasively so. See Fallon, supra note 4, at 1331–33.  
47. Dorf, supra note 14, at 249–51; see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 162–63. 
48. The presumption of severability can apply both to linguistically distinguishable bits of 
statutory text and to invalid applications of an otherwise undifferentiated statutory provision. See 
supra note 24. In a thoughtful and provocative dissent from the conventional wisdom regarding 
separability, Walsh, supra note 1, argues that the modern doctrine displaced an older, preferable 
approach under which courts simply declined to enforce statutory provisions insofar as they were 
“repugnant” to the Constitution, but felt no need to frame the further “severability” question of 
whether Congress would have intended a partially unconstitutional statute to be enforced 
following judicial excisions of invalid portions or applications.  
49. See Fallon, supra note 4, at 1331–33.   
50. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 163.   
51. 362 U.S. 17 (1960). 
52. See id. at 19. 
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enacted that authorization pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Although there was no question that Congress could validly forbid state 
officials such as the defendants from interfering with voting rights,
54 and could 
authorize suit against state officials to enforce their obligations, the defendants 
maintained that the statute also purported to regulate private conduct and to 
authorize suits against private actors.
55 By doing so, the defendants argued, the 
statute overreached Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment authority and was 
therefore facially invalid. 
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court began by quoting an earlier 
decision insisting that the Court, when exercising judicial review follows “two 
rules, to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to 
formulate a rule of law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it 
is to be applied.”
56 From these rules, Justice Brennan suggested, it followed 
that “[t]he delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional 
is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases,”
57 such as those to 
which the defendants necessarily referred in presenting their facial challenge. If 
a case presenting constitutional difficulties should arise in the future, Justice 
Brennan noted, the Court had previously recognized that “a limiting 
construction” that would avoid the prospect of unconstitutionality “could be 
given to the statute.”
58 
Among the reasons that Raines is significant is that it was a decision of 
the Warren Court, rendered after the Court had begun to relax the traditional 
rule forbidding third-party standing
59 and after it had developed the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
60 under which a statute may be declared 
void on its face if it also purports to prohibit too much constitutionally 
protected speech. Raines helped to promote the view that First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine, which indisputably licenses facial attacks, is an 
anomalous outlier.  
 
 
 
54. See id. at 25. 
55. See id. at 20. 
56. Id. at 21 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 
U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). 
57. Id. at 22. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. at 22–23. On third-party standing, see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
5, at 153–61. 
60. For a sympathetic account of the overbreadth doctrine as it had developed under the 
Warren Court, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 
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3. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 
The First Amendment overbreadth exception was expressly at issue in 
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades.
61 By the time of the Brockett decision, the Burger 
Court had already made clear that the doctrine, which had flowered under the 
Warren Court, would authorize facial invalidations only when a statute is 
“substantially overbroad”
62 and a narrowing construction that would moot 
constitutional objections is not readily available.
63 In Brockett, the Court stated 
the further qualification that the Court would not entertain an overbreadth claim 
“where the parties challenging the statute are those who desire to engage in 
protected speech that the overbroad statute purports to punish.”
64 In such cases, 
the Court reasoned, “[t]he statute may forthwith be declared invalid to the 
extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.”
65 In other words, Brockett 
held that a challenger who could prevail on an as-applied challenge should not 
be permitted to make a facial challenge, and that courts should rely on the 
presumption of severability to solve any problems that might arise under the 
valid rule requirement, even in First Amendment overbreadth cases. Brockett 
thus strongly affirms the propositions that facial challenges are and ought to be 
rare and points toward severability as the device through which statutes’ 
constitutional problems should ordinarily be cured. 
4. United States v. Salerno 
A final case that helps to illuminate the conventional reasoning with 
respect to facial challenges is United States v. Salerno.
66 In Salerno, the Court 
rejected arguments that the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which mandates pretrial 
detention without bail for some people accused of federal crimes, violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment.
67 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court 
explained why the facial challenge must fail in language that has framed much 
of the subsequent debate about the availability of facial challenges: 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult 
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.  
The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally 
under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it  
 
 
61. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
62. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 771 (1982). 
63. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24. 
64. 472 U.S. at 504. 
65. Id. 
66. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
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wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an “overbreadth” 
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.
68 
Post-Salerno commentary has emphasized that even the Salerno standard 
for facial challenges is not always impossible to satisfy in cases outside the 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
69 Clearly, some tests of constitutional 
validity—such as those that inquire whether the legislature that enacted a 
statute had a constitutionally forbidden purpose—can generate the conclusion 
that some statutes have no valid applications.
70 In an important intervention in 
the scholarly debate, Marc Isserles thus distinguished between what he called 
“valid rule facial challenges,”
71 which arise under judicially formulated tests 
that sometimes mark statutes as invalid based on reasons applicable to all 
possible applications,
72 and “overbreadth facial challenges,”
73 which seek to 
hold a statute invalid in toto because it has too many invalid applications. The 
conventional wisdom, which now largely incorporates this distinction,
74 holds 
that only a relatively few tests of constitutional validity authorize “valid rule 
facial challenges”
75 and that “overbreadth facial challenges” are rare, even if 
not wholly nonexistent, outside the First Amendment.
76 
B. Recent Cases 
A brief review of four relatively recent cases in which Supreme Court 
majorities have endorsed the conventional wisdom as I have described it will 
not only reinforce the sense that this is indeed the conventional wisdom, but 
also set the stage for a more accurate depiction of the Court’s actual practice in 
later Parts of this Article. 
1. Sabri v. United States 
In Sabri v. United States,
77 the government indicted a real estate developer 
under a federal statute that criminalized bribing any official of an organization, 
government, or agency that receives federal funds. Sabri argued that the statute 
was invalid on its face because it failed to require proof of a connection 
 
68. Id. at 745 (emphasis added). 
69. See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 14, at 371–451. 
70. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 279–81. 
71. See Isserles, supra note 14, at 363–64 (defining a “valid rule facial challenge” as one 
“which predicates facial invalidity on a constitutional defect inhering in the terms of the statute 
itself, independent of the statute’s application to particular cases”). 
72. See id. at 386–87. 
73. Id. at 363 (asserting that “an ‘overbreadth facial challenge’ . . . predicates facial 
invalidity on some aggregate number of unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid rule of 
law”). 
74. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 36, at 58–62 (accepting and applying the distinction). 
75. See id. at 421–51. 
76. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (listing “relatively few 
settings” in which “we have recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth”). 
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between federal funds and alleged bribes and because Congress had no 
authority under Article I to criminalize bribes unconnected with federal 
programs.
78 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter dismissed the argument that 
Congress had no power to enact the statute as written; the Spending and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses furnished ample authority.
79 
Although the opinion could have terminated at this point, Justice Souter 
went on to “add an afterword on Sabri’s technique for challenging his indictment 
by facial attack on the underlying statute.”
80 That afterword began “by recalling 
that facial challenges are best when infrequent.”
81 Quoting Raines, Justice Souter 
maintained that “[f]acial adjudication carries too much promise of ‘premature 
interpretatio[n] of statutes’ on the basis of factually barebones records”
82 and 
added that challenges such as that asserted by Sabri—who argued that “the 
statute could not be enforced against him, because it could not be enforced 
against someone else”
83—“are especially to be discouraged.”
84 Justice Souter 
acknowledged a “relatively few settings” in which the Court had “recognized the 
validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth (though not necessarily using that 
term).”
85 To illustrate his point, he cited cases involving freedom of speech, the 
right to travel, abortion, and legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
86 But “[o]utside of these limited settings,” he wrote, “we do not 
extend an invitation to bring overbreadth claims.”
87 
2. United States v. Georgia 
United States v. Georgia
88 arose from a paraplegic prison inmate’s suit 
against the state of Georgia for alleged violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fourteenth Amendment.
89 The constitutional 
issue before the Court was whether Congress, via a provision of the ADA, had 
validly abrogated Georgia’s sovereign immunity.
90 In earlier cases, the Court 
had held that federal statutory provisions purporting to strip states’ immunity 
came within Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment only if 
they were “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to an identified pattern of 
 
78. Id. at 604–05. 
79. Id. at 605–08. 
80. Id. at 608. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 609 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). 
83. Id. at 609. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 609–10. 
86. See id. at 610. 
87.I d .  
88. 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
89. Id. at 157. 
90. Id. at 156. On state sovereign immunity, see generally HART & WECHLSER, supra note 
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constitutional violations.
91 Applying that test, the Court appeared to hold 
several statutes facially unconstitutional.
92 
In United States v. Georgia, the Court declined to determine whether Title 
II of the ADA satisfied the “congruence and proportionality” test on its face. In 
an opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia noted that the prisoner’s 
“claims for money damages against the State under Title II were evidently 
based, at least in large part, on conduct that independently violated . . . the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”
93 Averring that “no one doubts that Section 5 grants 
Congress the power to . . . creat[e] private remedies against the States for 
actual violations” of the Fourteenth Amendment,
94 Justice Scalia held that Title 
II of the ADA “validly abrogates state sovereign immunity” as applied to such 
violations.
95 By holding the statute valid as applied, the Court effectively 
dismissed the state’s facial challenge and thereby affirmed the conventional 
wisdom that facial challenges should rarely succeed, apparently because the 
presumption of severability promises to solve constitutional difficulties that 
might materialize in future cases. 
3. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England 
In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
96 the Court 
reviewed a lower court decision that held that a state statute requiring minors to 
notify their parents before obtaining an abortion was facially unconstitutional 
because it failed to provide an exception for cases of medical emergency. In an 
opinion by Justice O’Connor, the Court unanimously agreed that the statute 
was invalid under its precedents insofar as it failed to provide an emergency 
exception.
97 The Court also observed that the court of appeals’ decision holding 
the statute facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable in all cases was 
“understandable, for we, too, have previously invalidated an abortion statute in 
its entirety because of the same constitutional flaw.”
98 But it was error, Justice 
O’Connor wrote, not to “contemplate relief more finely drawn.”
99 Quoting 
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, the Court affirmed that “the ‘normal rule’ is that 
‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course,’ such that a 
 
  91. See, e.g., Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 
(1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000). 
  92. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 638–48 (Patent Remedy Act); Kimel, 528 U.S. 
at 67 (provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act purporting to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity); see also Metzger, supra note 24, at 876 (“[M]any of the Court’s recent 
Section 5 decisions appear (at least at first glance) to invalidate the statutes there challenged on 
facial grounds.”). 
  93. 546 U.S. at 157. 
  94. Id. at 158. 
  95. Id. at 159. 
  96. 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
  97. Id. at 327–28. 
  98. Id. at 330–31. 
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‘statute may be declared invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise 
left intact.’”
100 In this case, “background constitutional rules”
101 made it plain 
that the statute could survive constitutional scrutiny if invalidated as applied to 
emergency cases. Accordingly, the Court held that partial invalidation, not total 
invalidation, was the appropriate “remedy,”
102 as long as “New Hampshire’s 
legislature intended the statute to be susceptible to such a remedy,”
103 
presumably under the normally applicable presumption of separability. 
4. Gonzales v. Carhart 
The unanimity displayed in Ayotte fractured the following year in 
Gonzales v. Carhart,
104 but an adamant five-Justice majority restated the 
conventional wisdom even more forcefully than Ayotte had. Carhart presented 
a challenge to a federal statute that banned an abortion technique dubbed 
“partial-birth abortion,” but did not prohibit other methods.
105 The challengers 
alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because it included no 
exception for cases in which the forbidden technique would be necessary to 
protect the health of the mother.
106 Reversing the lower court, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion assumed that the statute would be unconstitutional 
as applied to any cases in which it confronted women with actual health 
risks,
107 but found medical uncertainty about whether any such cases existed 
and ruled that a facial challenge necessarily failed in light of the uncertainty.
108 
Having so ruled, Justice Kennedy went on to render the “further determination 
that these facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first 
instance.”
109 It would not be “within our traditional institutional role” to try to 
anticipate when the challenged ban might possibly constitute an undue burden 
on abortion rights, he wrote.
110 Instead, the challengers should be remitted to 
the “as-applied challenges [that] are the basic building blocks of constitutional 
adjudication.”
111 
 
100. Id. at 329. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 330–31. 
103. Id. at 331. 
104. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
105. Id. at 140–42, 150. 
106. Id. at 161. 
107. See id. at 167–68. 
108. Id. at 163–67. 
109. Id. at 167. 
110. Id. at 168. 
111. Id. (quoting Fallon, supra note 4, at 1328). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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III. 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND THE NEAR UBIQUITY OF FACIAL 
CHALLENGES 
As should now be clear, the Justices of the Supreme Court sometimes say, 
and undoubtedly believe, that facial challenges, and especially successful facial 
challenges, are and should be rare; that the Court almost invariably rules on as-
applied challenges before considering facial challenges; that only a few 
stringent and anomalous tests such as the First Amendment overbreadth test 
frame facial challenges; and that a presumption of severability typically defeats 
facial challenges by allowing a court simply to assume that any possibly invalid 
statutory applications could be severed from valid ones in future cases. The 
Justices also believe that it is possible, in cases such as Salerno, to state 
generally applicable, transsubstantive rules specifying when facial challenges 
can and cannot succeed, without regard to the constitutional provision under 
which a challenge occurs or the character of the law whose enforcement is 
being challenged. 
On all of these points, the conventional wisdom is false. To establish this 
claim, this Part begins by identifying some of the astonishingly large number of 
constitutional provisions under which the Supreme Court has upheld facial 
challenges. It then presents the results of a more systematic study of all 
Supreme Court cases decided on the merits during each of six Terms over a 
twenty-six-year period. That survey strongly corroborates the conclusion that 
facial challenges are at least as common as as-applied challenges in the 
Supreme Court and that facial challenges frequently prevail. A final subsection 
discusses how these two types of evidence, either singly or in conjunction, 
specifically refute one or another tenet of the conventional wisdom. 
A. Facial Challenges Hiding in Plain Sight 
Powerful evidence that the Supreme Court routinely entertains, and not 
infrequently upholds, facial challenges emerges from examination of the 
leading cases under a broad range of constitutional provisions, as reflected in a 
single Constitutional Law
112 and a single Federal Courts casebook.
113 A survey 
of leading cases unmistakably demonstrates that the Court has held statutes 
wholly invalid under nearly every provision of the Constitution under which it 
has adjudicated challenges to statutes.   
In cases involving challenges to Congress’s authority to enact legislation 
under Article I, the Court has held statutes wholly invalid under the 
Qualifications Clause,
114 the Presentment Clause,
115 and the Suspension 
 
112. See J ESSE  H.  CHOPER, ET AL.,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW:  CASES–COMMENTS–
QUESTIONS (10th ed. 2006). 
113. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5. 
114. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 828–36 (1995). 
115. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447–49 (1998); INS v. Chadha,
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Clause.
116 Within the past two decades, it has twice ruled that statutes exceeded 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
117 Indeed, a subsequent 
decision, in Gonzales v. Raich,
118 can be read as rejecting the possibility of 
successful as-applied challenges to assertions of legislative power under the 
Commerce Clause and thus as establishing that all attacks must be facial if they 
are to have any chance at success.
119  The Court has struck down state 
legislation under the Contracts Clause
120 and the Import-Export Clause.
121 It 
frequently invalidates state statutes under the dormant Commerce Clause.
122   
In other decisions enforcing the Constitution’s structural provisions, the 
Court has ruled statutory provisions invalid, apparently in all applications, 
because they trenched on powers reserved to the President by Article II
123 or 
conflicted with Article III.
124 Printz v. United States
125 found that a statutory 
provision requiring state and local law enforcement officials to enforce federal 
law violated assumptions of dual sovereignty implicit in the Constitution’s 
structure. The Court has repeatedly held statutes that discriminate against out-
of-staters unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV.
126 It often finds state statutes and regulations to be preempted by 
federal law and thus wholly unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause of 
Article VI.
127 
Myriad Supreme Court decisions have pronounced statutes invalid under 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
128 Many of these rulings have 
 
U.S. 919, 952–59 (1983). 
116. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
117. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2001); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S.549, 559–68 (1995). 
118. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
119. See Franklin, supra note 36, at 62–68; Meier, supra note 1, at 1563. 
120. See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977).  
121. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009). 
122. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994); C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389–94 (1994); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894 (1988); New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
275–80 (1988); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 576 
(1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 
336–38 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978); Dean Milk Co. 
v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527–28 (1935). 
123. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 
(2010); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 414 U.S. 1 (1976). 
124. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 238–40 (1995); United States v. 
Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
125. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
126. See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. State Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 315 (1998); Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978). 
127. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–53 (2001). 
128. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 
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laid down or reaffirmed tests of constitutional validity that can be, and often 
have been, employed to hold other statutes invalid in toto. These include tests 
that inquire whether statutes regulating speech or expression are substantially 
overbroad,
129 whether they are narrowly tailored to further compelling 
governmental interests,
130 and whether restrictions on commercial speech 
directly advance substantial government interests and are no more extensive 
than necessary.
131 
A formidably large number of decisions have found statutes unconstitu-
tional under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. In Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the Court held a statute facially invalid under the 
Free Exercise Clause.
132  More frequently, the Court has declared statutes 
invalid under the Establishment Clause,
133 often because of their failure to 
satisfy one or another prong of the much criticized but frequently applied three-
part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.
134 Pursuant to the Lemon test, laws and 
regulations will fall to constitutional challenge if they lack a secular purpose, 
have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or 
promote an excessive government entanglement with religion.
135  
Several cases have pronounced statutes facially invalid because they inter-
fere with a constitutionally protected right to travel.
136 The Court found support 
for the underlying right in the First Amendment in Aptheker v. Secretary of 
State
137 and in the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause in 
Saenz v. Roe.
138 A number of decisions under the Eighth Amendment have held 
statutes unconstitutional for failing to impose proper safeguards against 
 
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533–36 (2001); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 
827 (2000); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 348–53 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991); Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 
573 (1987); Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); FCC v. League of Women 
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 750, 773 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974); Chi. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). 
129. See, e.g., Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577. 
130. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
131. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 533–36. 
132. 508 U.S. 520, 542, 545 (1993). 
133. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000); Bd. of Educ. of 
Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 
(1987); Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 
(1985); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 
(1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). 
134. 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971). 
135. See id. 
136. This line of cases starts with Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867). 
137. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
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arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
139 Indeed, the precedent-shattering 
decision in Furman v. Georgia
140 either held or established that the death 
penalty statutes in thirty-nine states were unconstitutional.
141 
The Supreme Court has quite frequently held legislation unconstitutional 
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
sometimes based on procedural
142 and sometimes based on substantive 
defects.
143 In doing so, the Court, depending on the nature of the case, has 
faulted legislation for failing to be rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest,
144 for not meeting the demands of strict judicial scrutiny,
145 and for 
imposing an undue burden on abortion rights.
146 City of Chicago v. Morales
147 
held that an ordinance making it a crime to loiter in a public place after having 
been asked to disperse by a police officer who reasonably believed one of the 
persons present to be a gang member was facially invalid on vagueness grounds 
because it failed to cabin police discretion adequately. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has invalidated statutes 
because they discriminated against racial minorities, in a line of cases including 
Brown v. Board of Education,
148 and because they awarded race-based 
affirmative action preferences not narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
governmental interest, as in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
149 The Court 
has also applied strict scrutiny to strike down state laws disadvantaging 
aliens.
150 In the domain of gender, the Court held a statutory provision discri-
minating against women not to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest 
in Reed v. Reed.
151 Since Craig v. Boren
152 in 1976, the Court has most often 
 
139. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 335, 335–36 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285–305 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
140. 408 U.S. 238, 239–49 (1972). 
141. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 112, at 527. 
142. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 308 U.S. 47 (1969). 
143. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 
922 (2000); City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60–64 (1999); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
144. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Hooper v. Bernallilo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622–
24 (1985); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 543. 
145. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 
146. See, e.g., Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 887–
98. 
147. 527 U.S. at 60–64. 
148. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1969); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
149. 488 U.S. 469, 507–08 (1989); see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–76 (2003); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating voluntarily adopted public 
school student assignment plans that relied on race to promote integration). 
150. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 376–77 (1971). 
151. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
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applied a test inquiring whether the government’s reliance on gender serves 
important state interests to which the statutory discrimination is “substantially 
related.”
153 In other equal protection cases, the Court has sometimes found 
statutory classifications to be irrational, and thus invalid, in their discrimination 
against illegitimate children,
154 single persons,
155 and homosexuals.
156 
The Supreme Court has also relied on the Equal Protection Clause in 
invalidating statutes that failed to conform to one-person, one-vote norms
157 
and in striking down statutory provisions establishing voting districts when 
racial considerations were the predominant factor leading to those provisions’ 
enactment.
158 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections
159 held that a statute 
making payment of a poll tax “a prerequisite of voting” violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because voting was a fundamental right and “[w]ealth, like 
race, creed, or color is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in 
the electoral process.”
160 In a line of cases beginning with Shapiro v. 
Thompson,
161 the Supreme Court has relied on the Equal Protection Clause to 
strike down a number of state statutes imposing duration-of-residency 
requirements as a precondition to the receipt of important benefits or the 
exercise of fundamental rights.
162 
The Supreme Court has relied on facial invalidations not only to enforce 
the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also to thwart 
what a majority has viewed as attempted overstepping of Congress’s 
constitutionally conferred enforcement powers under Section 5. Several 
decisions have thus ruled that statutory provisions purporting to abrogate the 
states’ sovereign immunity from suit were invalid, apparently in toto, because  
 
 
 
153. In  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539–46 (1996), which invalidated an 
admissions policy that categorically excluded women from attendance at a state military college, 
the Court emphasized the further requirement that gender-based discriminations require an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification.” 
154. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 
766–76 (1977). 
155. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
156. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). 
157. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (affirming a lower court decision 
that held a state districting statute unconstitutional on its face); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. 
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 734–35 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
158. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920–28 
(1995). 
159. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
160. Id.; see also Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1969) (holding that a 
statute limiting voting in school district elections mostly to parents of school children and to those 
who owned or leased real property in the district or were married to someone who did could not 
survive the “exacting judicial scrutiny” applicable to “statutes distributing the franchise”). 
161. 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). 
162. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (involving 
emergency medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (involving voting rights). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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they were not “congruent and proportional” to an identified pattern of 
constitutional violations by states.
163  
B. An Empirical Survey of All Cases in Six Supreme Court Terms 
In order further to test the conventional wisdom concerning facial 
challenges in the Supreme Court, and in particular the propositions that facial 
challenges are anomalous and rarely succeed, I conducted—with very 
substantial reliance on the work of research assistants—an empirical 
examination of all Supreme Court decisions during the October 2009, 2004, 
1999, 1994, 1989, and 1984 Terms. The results of this survey, which will be 
presented in a table below and summarized more fully in an Appendix, provide 
strong evidence that facial challenges in the Supreme Court are more normal 
than aberrant and that they quite frequently prevail. In every one of the Terms 
that we surveyed, the Court adjudicated more facial challenges on the merits 
than it did as-applied challenges. The overall success rate for facial challenges 
was also higher than that for as-applied challenges.
164 Perhaps most striking, in 
only four cases in the sample did a majority of the Court express a preference 
for as-applied over facial adjudication based on a role-based reluctance to hold 
statutes invalid in toto.
165 
Although the survey results corroborate my thesis about the frequency 
with which the Supreme Court entertains and upholds facial challenges, the 
overall picture that emerged is in some ways less clear-cut than I would have 
hoped. As the Appendix explains, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate facial 
from as-applied challenges, partly but not exclusively because the Court is 
often inattentive to the distinction. In addition, the coding of cases in which the 
Court noted that the parties had presented either facial or as-applied challenges 
but did not rule squarely on their merits required a number of methodological 
decisions that others might make differently. Although readers should thus take 
the numbers presented here with a grain of salt, at least until they have read the 
Appendix, I would expect the findings of others who examined the Supreme 
Court’s decisions during the same six Terms to align with my conclusions in 
their general thrust.
166 
 
163. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67, 91–92 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637–48 (1999). 
164. The respective numbers were 44 percent and 38 percent. 
165. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 37–41 (1999); 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–79 (1995); Brockett v. Spokane 
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502–07 (1985); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 447 (1985). 
166. For anyone who might wish to check or challenge the categorizations that our tallies 
reflect, Section C of the Appendix lists every case that we recorded as presenting either a facial or 
an as-applied challenge, denotes whether we characterized the challenge as successful or 
unsuccessful, and explains the exercise of judgment that underlie our coding in many of the cases 
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1. Empirical Findings 
The following table summarizes our findings regarding facial and as-
applied challenges in the Supreme Court during the 2009, 2004, 1999, 1994, 
1989, and 1984 Terms: 
 
Table 1: Count and Success of Facial and As-Applied Challenges in the 
Supreme Court, 1984–2009 
   Term   
   1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 TOTAL 
Cases 
Adjudicated 
Total  151  139  86 77 79 87  619 
Facial   18 17 10 20  5  6  76 
As-Applied  9  14  6 7 3 4  43 
Both Facial  
and As-Applied 
4 5 1 0 3 0  13 
Success 
Rate 
Facial 
11/22 
(50%) 
4/22 
(18%) 
7/11 
(64%) 
12/20 
(60%) 
2/8 
(25%) 
3/6 
(50%) 
39/89 
(44%) 
As-Applied 
4/13 
(31%) 
5/19 
(26%) 
4/7 
(57%) 
5/7 
(71%) 
2/6 
(33%) 
1/4 
(25%) 
21/56 
(38%) 
2. Preliminary Discussion 
Prior to further discussion of how the results of my empirical survey 
support this Article’s general claims about the relative frequency and success 
rates of facial and as-applied challenges, I offer four comments about change—
or its relative absence—in the Court’s pattern of decisions over a twenty-six-
year period. 
First, the number of cases presenting either facial or as-applied challenges 
to statutes constitutes a smaller proportion of the Court’s docket than I might 
have guessed. Many of the Court’s cases involve statutory questions only. As 
explained in the Appendix, many more involve the constitutionality of actions 
by lower court judges or government officials that may be authorized, but are 
not mandated, by statutes and that the parties do not frame as involving a 
challenge to a statute. Examples include many challenges to lower court 
judges’ rulings on evidentiary motions and to the constitutionality of searches 
and seizures. 
Second, although there is surprising year-to-year variation in the numbers 
of facial and as-applied challenges that the Court entertained, there is no clear 
trend line indicating either increasing or diminishing receptivity to facial 
challenges. The Court decided significantly fewer cases presenting 
constitutional challenges to statutes in the 2009 and 2004 Terms than it had in 
previous terms, but review of as-applied challenges declined nearly as 
markedly as review of facial challenges. There is no obvious pattern to the rates 
at which facial challenges succeed. 
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Third, although the survey included only one Term of the Roberts Court 
(compared with four for the Rehnquist Court and one for the Burger Court), the 
results for the 2009 Term do not demonstrate any sharp break with past Court 
practice in either adjudicating or sustaining facial or as-applied challenges.
167 
Fourth, the evidence I examined provides no support for the hypothesis 
that the Court’s 1987 decision in United States v. Salerno,
168 which framed the 
test that facial challenges must meet in especially stringent terms, marked a 
significant turning point. Although the percentage of successful facial 
challenges declined from 50 percent in the 1984 Term to 18 percent in the 1989 
Term, there was little change in the number of facial challenges that the Court 
addressed on the merits. Probably more significantly, by the 1999 Term, the 
total number of facial challenges adjudicated approached the 1984 level—even 
though the total number of cases on the Court’s merits docket had declined by 
more than half—and the success rate for facial challenges was actually higher 
(60 percent as compared with 50 percent). 
C. The Conventional Wisdom Reappraised 
The evidence emerging from an informal review of leading Supreme 
Court cases and a more systematic examination of the cases decided during six 
of the Court’s Terms reveals the conventional wisdom about facial challenges 
as astonishingly wide of nearly every relevant mark. 
1. Facial Challenges Are Not Rare or Categorically Suspect 
Without need for further explanation, the evidence adduced above should 
dispose of the fallacy that facial challenges, or even successful facial challenges, 
are anomalous. As noted above, some commentators have correctly pointed out 
that facial challenges succeed substantially more often than the Supreme Court 
acknowledges,
169 but none, so far as I am aware, has adequately described or 
documented the breadth of the range of cases in which the Court has upheld 
facial challenges,
170 frequently without even denominating them as such. 
In an important article referred to earlier, Marc Isserles simultaneously 
attacked the conventional wisdom that facial challenges are rare and disfavored 
and, by introducing a conceptual distinction among facial challenges, largely 
reaffirmed the conventional wisdom regarding what he called “overbreadth 
facial challenges.”
171 According to Isserles, both the Supreme Court and 
 
167. It is possible, of course, that examination of more Roberts Court Terms would support 
the judgment of some that the Roberts Court tends to prefer as-applied to facial adjudication—and 
perhaps especially as-applied to facial invalidation—more frequently than its predecessors.  
168. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
169. See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 14, at 439; Dorf, supra note 14, at 248–49. 
170. Cf. Adler, supra note 15 (purporting to establish on analytical grounds, rather than on 
the basis of an empirical survey, that all challenges to statutes are facial challenges). 
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scholarly commentators have erred by conflating overbreadth facial challenges, 
which are indeed disfavored, with what he calls valid rule facial challenges, 
which succeed much more frequently. When tested against Part III.A’s long list 
of successful facial challenges, however, Isserles’s effort t o  r e v i s e  t h e  
conventional wisdom looks shaky. Although it is widely believed that 
“overbreadth facial challenges” constitute a distinctive and distinctively 
problematic category, readily distinguished from “valid rule facial 
challenges,”
172 the distinction is by no means always easy to apply. In any 
linguistically natural sense of the term, moreover, overbreadth facial challenges 
are actually quite common. 
As defined by Isserles, overbreadth facial challenges are ones in which the 
challenger must point to cases other than her own to illustrate the vice of the 
statute that she challenges.
173 An example of this kind of overbreadth analysis 
comes from obscenity doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that “obscenity” 
lies beyond the protection of the First Amendment, but it has defined obscenity 
narrowly, so that a good deal of sexually explicit speech is not technically 
obscene.
174 In this context, a purveyor of acknowledged obscenity may argue 
that a statute restricting sexually explicit speech should be deemed overbroad 
and therefore facially invalid only because it would be unconstitutional as 
applied to others, who are not before the court, and who trade in speech that is 
sexually explicit but not obscene. 
Given his definition of “overbreadth,” Isserles concludes that neither strict 
nor intermediate judicial scrutiny requires overbreadth analysis, properly 
understood.
175 Instead, those and many other tests that call for close tailoring of 
statutory terms to further compelling or important government interests 
“predicate[] facial invalidity on the basis of a constitutional infirmity on the 
face of the statute, independent of constitutional defects arising from the 
statute’s application to particular cases.”
176 A good case to illustrate Isserles’s 
analysis is United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
177 which invalidated 
a statutory provision that required cable television operators to implement 
measures to prevent “signal bleed” from sexually explicit programming as a 
means of protecting children. In finding that the provision was not narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest, the Court did not 
conclude that it was invalid because it would be impermissible as applied to 
some cases. Rather, the Court appeared to believe that the statute was 
unconstitutional because there were less restrictive means of protecting 
children from unwanted exposure to sexually explicit programming in all 
 
172. See id. 
173. See id. 
174. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining constitutionally unprotected 
obscenity). 
175. See Isserles, supra note 14, at 416–21. 
176. See id. at 423. 
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cases
178—for example, by putting the onus to monitor signal bleed and to 
complain about it when it occurred on parents who objected. 
Although Isserles’s distinction of strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring 
requirement from overbreadth tests is illuminating in some cases, in the end it 
cannot bear the weight that he, and others who have followed him, place on it. 
When inquiring whether statutes are narrowly tailored, courts must often 
anticipate cases that may differ in material respects from the case before them 
in order to ascertain whether a statute will withstand constitutional attack.  
A plain example, already cited above, comes from strict judicial scrutiny 
as applied in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
179 Because affirmative action 
preferences for the actual victims of past discrimination would have been 
permissible,
180 the vice of the challenged statute, which led the Court to 
invalidate it, was that it extended minority preferences too broadly.
181 
The intermediate scrutiny test, which the Court has often employed to 
invalidate statutes that discriminate on the basis of gender, can also elicit a type 
of overbreadth analysis. The statute invalidated in Craig v. Boren,
182 which 
barred young men but not young women from purchasing low-alcohol beer, 
reflected a stereotype-based generalization that young men would be more 
likely than young women to drink excessively and then drive drunkenly. As 
applied to some young men and young women, that stereotyped generalization 
would surely have been true. If so, the vice of the statute that called for facial 
invalidation lay in its overbreadth. Moreover, that vice was not self-evident on 
the face of the statute, “independent of constitutional defects arising from the 
statute’s application to particular cases,”
183 because some statutes mandating 
gender-based discrimination are constitutionally valid.
184 In applying 
intermediate scrutiny, a court must consider a range of actual and possible 
applications to determine whether, in enough of them, a particular statute’s 
differential treatment of men and women is substantially related to an important 
governmental interest. 
In response to this analysis of Croson and Craig as reflecting judgments 
of overbreadth, one might try to argue that the defect of the challenged statutes 
resided in their reliance on stereotyped generalizations and, thus, pervaded all 
of the statutes’ applications. But this argument elides the crucial point. 
 
178. See id. at 827. 
179. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
180. See id. at 508–09; id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
181. See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 46, at 3 (distinguishing the form of 
overbreadth analysis concerned with regulatory precision from a form identified with special 
standing rules). 
182. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
183. Isserles, supra note 14, at 423. 
184. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a distinction between 
American citizen mothers and American citizen fathers of illegitimate children born abroad); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding the exclusion of women prison guards 
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Determination of whether the statutes were sufficiently closely related to a 
compelling or important governmental interest required the Court to consider a 
broad range of imagined statutory applications and to determine whether, in too 
many such cases, the generalization on which the statute rested was too 
inaccurate. The Court could not decide without assessing how the challenged 
statute would play out with respect to parties other than those immediately 
before it. And in making decisions, the Court must sometimes consider a 
statute’s potential application to parties whose cases differ significantly from 
that of the party before it. 
Other examples of the Court’s embrace of overbreadth facial challenges 
are even more unmistakable. Consider United States v. Lopez,
185 in which the 
Court struck down a federal statute forbidding the possession of guns in a 
school zone, on the ground that Congress lacked the power to enact the statute 
under the Commerce Clause. Because Congress could almost surely have 
forbidden the possession within a school zone of any gun that had traveled in 
interstate commerce,
186 the statute’s fatal defect lay in its overbreadth. 
The Court has sometimes invalidated statutes enacted pursuant to Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment on similar grounds. For example, in Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
187 
the Court held a statute that purported to abrogate the states’ sovereign 
immunity in suits for patent infringement to be facially invalid because it 
applied to too many cases not involving constitutional violations. In striking 
down the challenged provision, the Court offered no reply to Justice Stevens’s 
argument that the case actually before it involved a constitutional violation for 
which Section 5 authorized Congress to provide a remedy.
188 In the view of the 
majority, it was apparently the statute’s overbreadth that doomed it.
189 
In sum, even insofar as the conventional wisdom about the rarity of facial 
challenges might be limited to overbreadth facial challenges, the conventional 
wisdom is wrong. There is a germ of truth in the Supreme Court’s assertion, in 
Sabri v. United States,
190 that it responds more receptively to some kinds of 
overbreadth facial challenges than it does to others. But the Court’s jurispru-
dence, which generally welcomes facial challenges under virtually all judicially 
enforceable constitutional provisions, displays no consistent, analytically 
rigorous effort to differentiate and categorize various kinds of overbreadth.   
 
185. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
186. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 909 & n.14. 
187. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
188. See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s analysis “has nothing 
to do with the facts of this case”). 
189. Cf. Franklin, supra note 36, at 86–98 (characterizing the review conducted in cases 
resulting in facial invalidation of statutes under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause as overbreadth review because, although the statutes would otherwise have had 
some valid applications, they swept too broadly). 
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2. The Court Does Not Always Insist on Considering As-Applied Challenges 
First 
Although the Supreme Court sometimes says the contrary, it by no means 
always, or even typically, prefers as-applied to facial challenges on the 
grounds that the former furnish narrower bases for decision or that the latter 
overreach the bounds of judicial competence. To the contrary, the Court 
frequently eschews opportunities to decide cases on narrow, as-applied bases 
even when such bases are available. In the domain of the First Amendment, 
the Court’s pronouncement in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades
191 that federal 
courts should always entertain as-applied challenges before considering facial 
overbreadth claims, and should not rule on overbreadth claims at all if an as-
applied challenge succeeded, marked a departure from prior practice. In 
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc.,
192 the majority 
cited ten cases that it described as permitting facial rather than partial statutory 
invalidation at the behest of litigants who claimed that challenged statutes 
were unconstitutional as applied to them. Since Brockett, the Court has upheld 
facial challenges without first considering whether a statute was constitutional 
as applied to the plaintiffs in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for 
Jesus
193 and, during the 2009 Term, in United States v. Stevens,
194 which 
struck down a statute criminalizing the commercially motivated creation, sale, 
or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. Again during the 2009 Term, in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
195 the Court could have held 
a challenged provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act 
invalid as applied to the party before it, but instead opted to pronounce it 
invalid on its face.
196 In doing so, the majority cited the importance of 
avoiding the chilling of political speech.
197 
Outside of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine and the First 
Amendment more generally, the Court just as frequently seizes the opportunity 
to rule on facial, rather than as-applied, grounds. In Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections,
198 the Court could have held the poll tax invalid only as applied 
to the poor, but instead ruled more broadly and held the challenged statute 
facially invalid.
199 Prior to Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New 
England,
200 virtually all of the abortion cases reaching the Supreme Court 
involved facial attacks in which the Court accepted this framing of the 
 
191. 472 U.S. 291 (1985). 
192. 467 U.S. 947, 965 n.13 (1984). 
193. 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
194. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). 
195. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
196. Id. at 892–96. 
197. Id. at 896. 
198. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
199. Id. at 668. 
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question presented, without pausing to ask whether the challenger could 
succeed on an as-applied theory.
201 
The Court’s frequent openness to facial challenges in preference to as-
applied challenges arises partly from the flexibility that the Court accords to 
parties to shape the issues in litigation. For example, if Brown v. Board of 
Education
202 had been framed differently, the Supreme Court might imaginably 
have held state statutes mandating racially segregated education 
unconstitutional only as applied to cases in which the education provided to 
minorities was not equal to that provided to whites under tangible measures of 
educational quality.
203 There were almost certainly few if any public school 
systems in which a plausible case for actual material equality could have been 
made in 1954.
204 In the Supreme Court, however, the Brown plaintiffs chose 
not to contest lower court findings that the facilities involved in the various 
consolidated cases were materially equal and thus left the Court with only 
facial challenges to address.
205 
Even absent the parties’ decision to forego as-applied challenges, a 
Supreme Court that was confident of its ability to formulate a broadly 
applicable constitutional principle appropriately could have done so in 
Brown,
206 with the effect being a ruling that invalidated the statutes at issue on 
their faces.
207 An analogy comes from cases in which parties have challenged 
statutes as impermissibly discriminating on the basis of gender. It is possible to 
imagine the Court proceeding by seeking the most narrowly as-applied basis 
for decision in every case. For example, in Reed v. Reed,
208 it could have asked 
if the gender-based generalization or stereotype embodied in the statute before 
it could permissibly be applied to a particular challenger with respect to whom 
the generalization or stereotype might well have been inaccurate. But the cases 
suggest that the Court tends not to think that way. The Justices 
characteristically think in terms of constitutional rules and principles, which 
 
201. See Fallon, supra note 21, at 859 n.29. 
202. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
203. The Court had found equal protection violations on this basis in cases involving 
colleges and graduate schools in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938). 
204. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421, 426 (1960) (“[C]olored schools have been so disgracefully inferior to white schools that only 
ignorance can excuse those who have remained acquiescent members of a community that lived 
the Molochian child-destroying lie that put them forward as ‘equal.’”). 
205. See 347 U.S. at 492.  
206. See generally Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 449, 452 (2009) 
(maintaining that “judicial issue creation . . . is an essential means of protecting the judiciary’s 
role in the constitutional structure”). 
207. Cf. Meier, supra note 1, at 1565 (noting that the Court has not allowed pleading to 
determine whether it will treat a challenge as facial or as-applied). 
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frequently, perhaps typically, overrun calls for narrowly as-applied analysis.
209 
Given a rule of decision, the Justices will apply it, with no further preference 
for narrow, as-applied analysis. Nearly as frequently, the Court seizes fresh 
opportunities to formulate broad and broadly applicable rules of decision that 
push beyond narrow, as-applied decision making and that result in facial 
invalidation. It has done so in nearly all of the cases establishing the now 
governing doctrinal tests that dominate constitutional law.
210 
3. Facial Challenges Are Not Limited to Stringent Constitutional Tests 
It is not true that only a few constitutional tests license facial challenges. 
The catalogue of facial invalidations offered above adequately refutes any 
general claim to the contrary. Nor is it true that only relatively stringent tests 
call for statutes to be assessed, and potentially held invalid, on their faces. 
Although separating lax from stringent tests would require difficult exercises in 
line-drawing, there is no need to quibble about how to classify particular tests 
in order to establish the crucial point. The rational basis test, which nearly 
everyone agrees is the epitome of constitutional laxity, sometimes results in 
statutes being held facially invalid,
211 without a presumption of severability 
always authorizing the severing of all invalid applications. 
It is of course notorious that the Supreme Court sometimes endows the 
rational basis test with a stringency that the Court disavows in other cases.
212 
But even if challenges to statutes do not normally succeed under the rational 
basis test, they are always possible. In other words, even when the rational 
basis test has no bite whatsoever, it frames the question as whether challenged 
statutes are irrational, and thus unconstitutional, on their faces.  
4. The Court Does Not Apply an Unqualified or Consistent Presumption of 
Severability 
Regardless of the test of constitutional validity that a court applies, the 
Supreme Court’s cases falsify any claim that, outside of First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine, the Justices consistently apply a presumption of 
severability of the kind that commentators have often imagined—one that 
wholly postpones to the future the question of how, precisely, the severing even 
of substantial, invalid statutory applications would occur. The Court clearly 
requires that specific lines of severance be foreseeable in order for it to reject 
 
209. This is among the core insights of Adler, supra note 15. 
210. On the significance of doctrinal tests and the “extraordinary adjudication” in which 
the Supreme Court initially formulates them, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE 
CONSTITUTION, 45–101 (2001). 
211. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996); Hooper v. Bernallilo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71 (1971). 
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facial challenges under tests that are commonly viewed as relatively 
stringent,
213 including, as Justice Souter noted in Sabri v. United States,
214 
those applied in cases involving free speech and the rights to travel and 
abortion. But at least some limits on severability are necessarily assumed, and 
an unqualified presumption of severability thus rejected, even by some cases 
applying the rational basis test. 
If all of a statute’s invalid applications could always be assumed to be 
severable, without need for any advance specification of exactly how they 
could be severed, there would be no point in asking whether a statute fails the 
rational basis test based on its overinclusiveness.
215 Yet the Supreme Court has 
occasionally invalidated statutes under the rational basis test at least partly on 
the ground that they pursued a permissible goal by irrationally broad means—
such as by excluding all women from an opportunity available to men in Reed 
v. Reed
216 and denying all illegitimate children a benefit available to legitimate 
children in Trimble v. Gordon.
217 By implication, the Court also held that the 
presumption of severability could not cure the vagueness of a criminal 
antiloitering statute in City of Chicago v. Morales,
218 even though it is unimagi-
nable that the statute could have been vague in all possible applications.  
IV. 
MAKING (SOME) SENSE OF SUPREME COURT PRACTICE IN REBUFFING AND 
UPHOLDING FACIAL CHALLENGES 
With the conventional wisdom being so mistaken in so many respects, any 
successful effort to make sense of the Supreme Court’s actual practice in 
dismissing and sustaining facial challenges clearly requires a broad rethinking. 
In that rethinking, cases in which the Court professes wariness of facial 
challenges, prominently including those discussed in Part II, cannot be 
dismissed as mere aberrations. But the enormous number of cases in which the 
Court has sustained facial challenges, under a wide variety of constitutional 
provisions and pursuant to a broad range of tests, cannot be blinked away 
either. Rethinking that aspires to rationalize as much current practice as 
possible, rather than starting over from scratch or at least calling for wholesale 
reform, will thus have to be complex. 
 
213. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1985) (rejecting a 
facial challenge under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine only after identifying 
specifically how the challenged statute could be severed to accord with constitutional 
requirements). 
214. 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004). 
215. See generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the 
Laws, 37 CALIF.  L.  REV. 341 (1949) (discussing overinclusiveness as a basis for statutory 
invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause and rational basis review). 
216. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
217. 430 U.S. 762, 770–71 (1977). 
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Making sense of Supreme Court practice requires a three-part analysis. 
First, it is imperative to understand the role of doctrinal tests in guiding the 
Court to assess the constitutionality of statutes either on their faces or as 
applied. Second, the Court’s approach to severability needs a fresh analysis—
one that acknowledges occasional inconsistencies and highlights previously 
unrecognized complexities. Third, concerns about “premature” adjudication 
call for enhanced attention to the relationship between principles bearing on the 
availability of facial challenges and ripeness doctrine. 
A. The Role of Reasons 
The path to a better understanding of the Supreme Court’s practice in 
dismissing and upholding facial challenges starts with two banalities. Although 
noted already, both deserve reemphasis. First, all constitutional challenges to 
the enforcement of rules or statutes are in one sense as-applied, beginning with 
a challenger asserting that a statute cannot be enforced against her.
219 Second, a 
court, in accepting or rejecting a challenge to the enforcement of a statute, will 
do so on the basis of reasons, which very often reflect the tests of constitutional 
validity that the court applies. If the Supreme Court, in holding a statute 
unenforceable against a particular challenger, gives reasons broad enough to 
indicate that the statute cannot be enforced against anyone else, either, then it 
will effectively have held the statute facially invalid, even if it never employs 
those words. 
Although the Court often says that it always decides cases on the 
narrowest possible basis,
220 Part III demonstrated that its actual practice 
falsifies this claim, and rightly so. The Constitution frequently speaks in highly 
general language that different people, including judges and public officials, 
would understandably construe and apply quite differently. To the Supreme 
Court has fallen the task not only of specifying the Constitution’s meaning, but 
also of devising tests and formulae that will ensure the effective 
implementation—by lower court judges and other officials—of vague, 
sometimes contestable, values.
221 In order to discharge its responsibilities 
effectively, the Court must often, inevitably, look beyond the case at hand and 
establish rules to guide decision makers in other, similar cases. The Court 
behaves imprudently when it formulates broadly sweeping rules or tests 
without sufficient knowledge of the range of factual situations to which they 
will apply.   
Sometimes, however, the injunction to rule as narrowly as possible would 
constitute bad advice, precluding the Court from ruling broadly when a broad 
 
219. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
220. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1985). 
221. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term–Foreword: Implementing 
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ruling is exactly what the situation calls for.
222 Consider cases in which the 
Court says categorically that racially segregated public educational facilities are 
inherently unequal
223 or that a statute prescribing gender-based discrimination 
is invalid because it is not substantially related to an important state interest
224 
or that a statute violates the First Amendment because it discriminates on the 
basis of content or viewpoint without being justified by a compelling 
governmental interest.
225 Rather than speaking generally, the Court could 
typically, if not always, limit its decisions to features peculiar to the case before 
it.
226 That is, the Court could rule that, regardless of what the Constitution 
might permit in other cases, it will not allow a particular act of discrimination 
or the punishment of the particular speech at issue under the particular statute at 
issue. But the Court would default on its law-declaring and guidance-giving 
responsibilities if it always took that approach. 
Not surprisingly, Justices (and commentators) who disagree about 
contentious issues will frequently also diverge in their judgments about when 
the Court should issue broad rulings aimed at ensuring effective 
implementation of controversial rights in a large swath of cases and when it 
should stick close to the facts of the case before it. During the 2009 Term, the 
liberal Justices vehemently protested the majority’s decision in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission
227—an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy—
to bypass as-applied objections and hold a key provision of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act invalid in all applications.
228 In Gonzales v. Carhart, 
however, the roles were reversed. With Justice Kennedy again writing the 
opinion, this time it was the typically conservative Justices who insisted that 
the challenged prohibition against partial-birth abortion—which Justice 
Kennedy assumed would be unconstitutional as applied to any case in which it 
threatened a mother’s health
229—should not be invalidated or even tested on its 
face. Writing for the more liberal Justices, Justice Ginsburg vehemently decried 
the majority’s insistence on an as-applied approach, insisting that a broader 
 
222. Even Cass Sunstein, who argues strongly for judicial “minimalism” as the 
presumptively correct approach, recognizes that “the choice between minimalism and the 
alternatives depends on an array of contextual considerations, and it would be extravagant to say 
that minimalism is always better.” CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN, ONE  CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 38 (1999). 
223. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
224. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
225. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386–87 (1992). 
226. Cf. David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1333–34, 
1350 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions to hold particular statutes invalid on their 
faces reflect “strategic” calculations, involving the statutes’ propensity to chill constitutionally 
protected speech, their reliance on race- or gender-based stereotypes, or their tendency to invite 
invidiously discriminatory law enforcement).  
227. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
228. See 130 S. Ct. at 932–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
JJ.). 
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ruling of facial invalidity was the only practically effective means of ensuring 
that women would have access to the safest possible abortion procedures.
230 In 
both cases, as in many others, it is hard to separate what the Justices cast as 
general claims about the overall propriety of as-applied and facial challenges 
from views about how broadly particular rights should be defined and how 
aggressively they should be protected.
231 
A similar analysis applies when the Supreme Court deploys or formulates 
constitutional tests such as strict and intermediate scrutiny, the First 
Amendment overbreadth test, and so forth.
232 These tests, like many others, call 
for the Court to look beyond the specific facts of the challenger’s case and 
potentially to conclude that a statute is invalid in all its applications, as other 
relevantly similar statutes also would be. Such tests do so by furnishing 
templates for analysis and for the provision of either narrow or broad reasons 
for upholding constitutional challenges. Part III.A’s lengthy list of 
constitutional provisions under which the Supreme Court has held statutes 
facially invalid, often through the application of formulaic tests, suggests that 
the Court, in applying such tests, frequently upholds facial challenges without 
noting that it is deciding the case before it on a facial, rather than an as-applied, 
basis. Part III.B’s analysis of all cases decided during six Supreme Court Terms 
fortifies this conclusion. 
An important caution is in order, however. Because the reasons that the 
Supreme Court articulates for deciding a statute is invalid in one case may not 
always apply to all other cases involving the same statute, one should not leap 
too readily to the conclusion that a statute is invalid in all possible applications, 
even when the Court describes a statute as constitutionally invalid. Two 
examples, one historic and one relatively recent, illustrate the point. In Marbury 
v. Madison,
233 the Court characterized the inquiry before it as whether an “act” 
or “law” that was “repugnant to the constitution is void.”
234 Consistent with 
that formulation of the question, much of Marbury’s language suggested that a 
provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act was invalid on its face because it purported 
to expand the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits. 
Nevertheless, a close parsing of the Court’s opinion suggests that the 
challenged provision remained enforceable insofar as it empowered the Court 
to issue writs of mandamus in cases that were otherwise within the Court’s 
 
230. See id. at 187–90. 
231. See generally David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in 
Constitutional Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631 (2009) (linking the decision whether to consider and uphold facial 
challenges to a broader issue involving the “frames of reference” within which the Court defines 
constitutional rights). 
232. On the significance of doctrinal tests in framing facial challenges, see Fallon, supra 
note 4, at 1342–48; Isserles, supra note 14, at 428–51. 
233. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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lawful jurisdiction.
235 Language in City of Boerne v. Flores
236 may similarly 
tend to mislead. The Court’s opinion in Boerne appeared to pronounce the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) unconstitutional on the ground 
that it created rights against state and local governments that Congress had no 
power to impose under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
237 
Subsequently, however, the Court has treated RFRA as valid and enforceable 
insofar as it creates statutory rights against the federal government, rather than 
the states,
238 because the Court’s reasons for pronouncing RFRA 
unconstitutional under Section 5 do not hold in cases in which Congress has 
legislative authority under Article I. 
B. The Role of Severability 
As commentators have emphasized, presumptions of severability play a 
crucial role in explaining the Supreme Court’s pattern of responses to facial 
challenges.
239 In the absence of severability, all challenges to statutes would 
necessarily be facial, for a nonseverable statute that was invalid in some cases 
would necessarily be invalid as to all.
240 Conversely, severability sometimes 
dooms facial challenges.
241 But when does the presumption of severability 
apply, and when does it not apply? Commentators too easily assume that this 
question has a sharp, rule-like answer.   
A reexamination of Supreme Court practice yields a different conclusion. 
The Justices have not always paid heed to severability issues,
242 and, given 
their inattention, one could hardly expect consistent adherence to rule-like 
formulae.
243 The Court unanimously conceded the first point in Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
244 when it said that the court of 
appeals had erred in holding a statute regulating abortion facially 
 
235. See id. at 175; see also Walsh, supra note 1, at 755–65 (describing the Supreme Court 
of the early nineteenth century as declining to enforce statutes insofar as enforcement would 
violate the Constitution but as not assuming that a statute that was unenforceable in one case 
would therefore necessarily be unenforceable in another).  
236. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
237. See id. at 511 (“We conclude the statute exceeds Congress’ power.”). 
238. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
& n.1 (2006).  
239. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 162–63; Dorf, supra note 14, at 249–
51. Some commentators have asserted that severability is less important in determining the 
availability of facial challenges than others have maintained. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 1, at 
1572; Franklin, supra note 36, at 64–68. 
240. But see Walsh, supra note 1 (endorsing an approach focused on the extent to which 
statutes are enforceable, rather than on the question of whether they are valid). 
241. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
242. See Metzger, supra note 1, at 793 (observing that “the Court has not frequently 
acknowledged the important role played by severability . . . in facial challenges”). 
243. See Gans, supra note 24, at 652 (noting the Court’s inconsistency in dealing with 
severability issues). 
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unconstitutional, rather than severing it, even though the Court itself had 
“previously invalidated an abortion statute in its entirety because of the same 
constitutional flaw.”
245 In the previous case, the parties had not called the 
Court’s attention to the possibility of severing the statute, Justice O’Connor 
wrote, and the Justices had simply overlooked it.
246 
Other cases presenting severability issues similarly demonstrate 
inadvertence, inconsistency, or confusion. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
247 
the Court insisted that it would not address a facial challenge under the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine in a case brought by a challenger who could 
prevail on an as-applied challenge.
248 In a case of this kind, the Court said, the 
statute could and should be severed. As noted above, however, Brockett 
deviated from a number of precedents on this point, and the Court has not 
subsequently observed Brockett’s pro-severing and anti-facial-invalidation 
stricture in all First Amendment overbreadth cases presenting as-applied as 
well as facial challenges.
249 To offer just one more example, the Court’s initial 
cases applying a “congruence and proportionality” test to assess the 
constitutionality of legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment suggested that a statute found wanting under this standard could 
not be severed,
250 but more recent cases, including United States v. Georgia,
251 
have ruled otherwise.
252 The Justices have offered no explanation for the 
seeming change of course that would adequately refute suspicions of 
inconsistency. 
There is no reason, moreover, to think that recent Justices are less 
attentive to separability issues, or any more inconsistent in resolving them, than 
were their predecessors. As noted in passing above, commentators have long 
thought that they had to patch up the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the 
foundational case of Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Jackson Vinegar 
Co.
253 by ascribing to it a presumption of severability to which the Court’s 
opinion made no reference.
254 That ascription seems to solve the problem that 
commentators have seen in the Yazoo opinion, but it leaves open the question 
of how Yazoo related to cases such as the nearly contemporaneous Lochner v. 
New York,
255 which upheld a facial challenge to a law regulating the hours of 
employment of bakery workers under the same Due Process Clause that was 
 
245. Id. at 330–31. 
246. Id. at 331. 
247. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
248. See id. at 504. 
249. See supra notes 192–197 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
251. 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006). 
252. The Court also rejected a facial challenge based on a statute’s purported lack of 
congruence and proportionality in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
253. 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
254. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
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involved in Yazoo. In Lochner, the Court made no suggestion that the possi-
bility of statutory severing limited the challenger to asserting as-applied claims. 
The Court’s sometimes careless practice creates an analytical problem for 
anyone who seeks to make sense of its pattern of sometimes upholding and 
sometimes rejecting facial challenges. Nevertheless, I think it possible to make 
considerable progress in understanding when facial challenges succeed and 
when they do not by offering some generalizations—not falsifiable by one or 
even a few counterexamples—about when presumptions of severability will 
defeat facial challenges to statutes and when they will not.
256 Five such 
generalizations reveal important, recurring, and generally defensible patterns in 
the Court’s decision making. Of these, the most startling is the second, which 
contradicts the conventional wisdom that the Court typically presumes statutory 
severability to be possible without significant attention to the lines along which 
severing could occur. 
First, invalid but unusual or infrequent applications of a statute are always 
presumptively severable. Even in First Amendment overbreadth cases, a facial 
challenge can succeed only if a statute is substantially overbroad.
257 A 
relatively few invalid applications are invariably assumed severable under less 
exacting tests.
258 
Second, when substantial severing would be necessary to save a statute 
from invalidity, the Court will reject a facial challenge on severability grounds 
if it can identify a relatively surgically precise way of curing the defect that an 
applicable test has identified—provided, as will be discussed below, that what I 
am calling “surgical severing” accords with legislative intent—but not 
otherwise. For example, if the Court determines that a statute would otherwise 
be substantially overbroad under the First Amendment overbreadth test, it will 
normally sever the statute and hold it only partially invalid if, but only if, it can 
identify a particular, precise way of severing the statute that cures the defect of 
substantial overbreadth.
259  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades
260 illustrates how 
surgical severing, as specifically imagined when a statute is tested for 
 
256. For the related suggestion that whether to treat statutes as severable depends on 
relatively ad hoc, pragmatic judgments, see Dorf, supra note 14, at 290–91. 
257. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 772 (1982). 
258. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“We have never held that a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it 
is possible to conceive of a single impermissible application, and in that sense a requirement of 
substantial overbreadth is already implicit in the doctrine.”)). 
259. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997) (“In considering a facial challenge, this 
Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a 
construction.”) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Bookseller’s Ass’n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)); see 
also Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987) (invalidating a 
resolution as overbroad on its face in the absence of an “apparent saving construction”); Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964) (finding facial invalidation appropriate where a challenged 
loyalty oath was “open to . . . an indefinite number” of interpretations). 
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constitutional validity on its face, differs from reliance on an otherwise 
unspecified,  ex ante presumption that invalid applications can somehow be 
severed and that absolves a court from responsibility to determine how. In 
holding that an anti-obscenity statute should be severed rather than facially 
invalidated, the Court identified precisely how the statutory term that gave rise 
to an overbreadth problem—“lust”—could be limited to remedy the problem of 
substantial overbreadth: the statute should be invalidated “only insofar as the 
word ‘lust’ is taken to include normal interest in sex.”
261  
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
262 which 
signaled the Court’s preference for partial rather than facial invalidation of an 
anti-abortion law, also illustrates the distinction between surgical severing and 
a presumption that some unspecified way of severing can be found in future 
cases. It does so by noting that a court’s capacity to identify a constitutionally 
adequate partial invalidation “often depends on how clearly we have articulated 
the background constitutional rules.”
263 In Ayotte, the Court unanimously 
thought that severing was appropriate (if consistent with legislative intent) 
because background rules established that a statute requiring minors to notify 
their parents before obtaining an abortion was unconstitutional insofar, but only 
insofar, as it failed to provide an emergency exception. Invalidating the statute 
as applied to emergency cases thus offered a surgical solution to the problem 
that the applicable test of constitutional validity revealed. 
Crucially, however—and contrary to the usual understanding of the 
presumption of severability—the Court ordinarily will not uphold a statute 
against facial challenge when the statute would require relatively substantial 
severing in order to survive unless it can foresee reasonably precise lines along 
which severance could occur. How surgically precise the foreseen lines must be 
in order for a challenged statute to pass constitutional muster will of course 
vary, depending on the constitutional tests and doctrine that form the 
background to a particular facial challenge. Almost self-evidently, it takes a 
more finely grained surgical severance to save a statute from invalidity under a 
narrow tailoring than under a rational basis test. As I have said already, 
however, a statute could never be irrational because overbroad if all invalid 
applications could always be severed from valid ones on an ad hoc basis. 
 Third, in cases in which a surgical severing would clearly be possible if 
necessary, the Court sometimes rejects facial challenges without deciding 
whether a surgical severing is in fact necessary. Illustrations come from United 
 
261. Id. at 504–05; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 883 (severing the term “or 
indecent” from a statutory prohibition against “obscene or indecent” communications); United 
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182–83 (1983) (invalidating a ban against expressive displays on 
Supreme Court grounds as applied to sidewalks but not otherwise). 
262. 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
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States v. Raines,
264 United States v. Georgia,
265 and, more surprisingly, from 
Yazoo.
266 In Raines, a suit predicated on conduct by state officials interfering 
with voting rights, the Court thought it unnecessary to decide whether Congress, 
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, could permissibly have barred 
private interference with voting rights. There was no need, I would suggest, 
because even if the challenged statute swept too broadly, the line between public 
officials and private parties offered a plainly adequate basis for surgical severing 
if the Court decided in a future case that such was necessary. United States v. 
Georgia appears to reflect the same understanding that a court can presume 
statutory severability, without deciding whether it is necessary, when the line 
along which a statute could be surgically severed is clear. In U.S. v. Georgia, 
“no one doubt[ed]” Congress’s power to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity 
for actual violations of constitutional rights.
267 If the Court should determine in a 
future case that Title II of the ADA was invalid as applied to other cases, the 
obvious cure for the lack of “congruence and proportionality” would be to sever 
statutory applications not involving actual constitutional violations. 
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Jackson Vinegar Co.,
268 which 
now seems to me to have confused and misled both courts and commentators 
for many decades, would be best explained on the same basis. As argued above, 
it is a mistake to posit—as commentators frequently have—that when a statute 
is challenged under the rational basis test, a court can assume, without more, 
that even a very large proportion of invalid applications can always be severed 
in unspecified, nonsurgical ways in future cases. If this were so, courts could 
never hold that statutes are irrational on their faces because they sweep too 
broadly, as courts occasionally, albeit rarely, do. Yazoo is easily distinguishable 
from cases that have held statutes irrationally overinclusive, however, because 
in Yazoo, unlike those cases, there was an obvious surgical cure if severing 
turned out to be necessary in a future case. Even if the challenged statute was 
invalid as applied to cases involving frivolous, excessive, or disputable claims 
for damages, it could have been so severed as to remain enforceable in cases 
involving admittedly valid claims, such as the one before the Court. 
Fourth, any severing must accord with legislative intent.
269 In cases 
involving state statutes, severability is therefore primarily a matter of state 
law.
270 In cases presenting challenges to federal statutes, the Court has shown 
less than perfect consistency in its articulation of the proper gauge of 
 
264. 362 U.S. 17 (1960). 
265. 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
266. 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
267. Id. at 158–59. 
268. 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
269. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006); 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 163–65. 
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congressional intent.
271 It seems a fair generalization, however, that the Court 
assumes that Congress would not wish to retain only relatively anomalous opp-
ortunities for a statute’s enforcement after most of a statute has been severed. 
The Court probably also tends to presume that state legislatures would 
have similar preferences. This is another possible explanation for the Court’s 
inattention to separability issues in Lochner, for example. If all invalid 
applications of the statute had been severed, there might have been too little left 
for the Court to think that severing the statute to preserve a few anomalous 
applications would have accorded with legislative intent. Again, however, the 
evidence falls far short of establishing that the Court thought about severability 
at all in many cases in which it has held state statutes constitutionally invalid. 
Fifth, the severing of a statute must not require such a creative or 
unconstrained rewriting as to constitute what the Justices apprehend as 
“quintessentially legislative”
272 rather than judicial work.
273 It could perhaps go 
without saying that the degree of “rewriting” that courts can perform in 
severing a statute is a question of judgment,
274 not governed by hard rule.
275 
Clearly, however, the Supreme Court generally feels no obligation to sever 
statutes in imaginative ways not suggested either by the language of a 
challenged statute or, as in Ayotte, by “background constitutional rules.”
276 
 
 
271. See HART & WECHSLER’S 5TH EDITION, supra note 45, at 183–84 (reciting varying 
statements of the applicable standard). In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010), the Court found an invalid statutory provision 
separable where the remaining provisions were capable of operating independently “and nothing 
in the statute’s text or historical context makes it ‘evident’ that Congress, faced with the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution, would have preferred no [Public Company Accounting 
Oversight] Board to a Board whose members are removable at will.” 
272. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329. 
273. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884–85 (1997) (“This Court ‘will not rewrite a . . . 
law to conform it to constitutional requirements.’”) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Bookseller’s Ass’n., 
Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479–
80 (1985) (citing “[o]ur obligation to avoid judicial legislation” as a ground for declining to adopt 
a saving construction); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515–16 (1964) (declining to 
perform a “substantial rewriting” of a statute). 
274. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (observing that “we restrain ourselves from rewrit[ing] 
state law to conform it to constitutional requirements”) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). 
275. For a relatively recent case apparently testing the outer limits of permissible judicial 
action to save an otherwise unconstitutional statute, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), in which the Court, by 5–4, cured an identified constitutional defect in statutorily 
mandated sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines by rendering the Guidelines 
“effectively advisory.” Id. at 245. According to Gans, supra note 24, at 664, “[i]t is difficult to 
find a better example of . . . aggressive judicial lawmaking.” See also Skilling v. United States, 
130 S. Ct. 2896, 2939 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(protesting that the majority’s “paring down” of a statute to save it from unconstitutional 
vagueness was “clearly beyond judicial power”). 
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For example, in United States v. Lopez,
277 the federal statute barring 
possession of a gun in a school zone would almost surely have been 
constitutionally permissible as applied to guns that had traveled in interstate 
commerce.
278 And if most guns travel in interstate commerce, a ruling that 
severed the statute along these lines would have preserved most of the statute’s 
applications. Nevertheless, to sever the statute in this way would have required 
an exercise of creative imagination that the Court—which, as I have said, is not 
always attentive to issues of separability—did not understand itself as required 
to provide.
279 It is hard to know whether the Court might have responded 
differently if the parties had framed the case to present a severability issue. As 
the Court acknowledged in Ayotte,
280 it would have severed a statute and held it 
only partially invalid in Stenberg v. Carhart,
281 rather than having pronounced 
it wholly invalid, if the parties had called that option to the Court’s attention. 
The Court’s practice of not considering the possibility of creative, quasi-
legislative ways of severing statutes may help to explain why the Court has 
seldom paused to consider why statutes discriminating on the basis of race, 
gender, or status as an alien might be upheld as applied, but only as applied, to 
cases in which the crude or stereotypical assumptions that underlie those 
statutes turn out to be correct. A statute so rewritten by a court would be far, far 
removed from the one written by the legislature. 
To recapitulate: the Supreme Court’s pattern of reliance and nonreliance 
on presumptions of severability exhibits reasonable consistency and 
considerable good sense, as reflected in the five foregoing generalizations. 
Taken together, these generalizations can explain nearly all of the relevant 
Supreme Court cases. Nevertheless, the Court’s practice does not appear to be 
rigidly governed by rule. Among other things, the Justices may respond 
differently in cases in which parties call severability issues to their attention 
than they would respond, somewhat unthinkingly, in cases in which the parties 
do not.  
C. The Role of Ripeness 
In looking at the Court’s overall pattern of decisions, it is important to 
keep in mind a distinction between two easily confused questions. The first is 
whether a statute is in principle subject to facial challenge. To this question, the 
normal answer is yes; most tests of constitutional validity potentially frame 
facial challenges. The second question is whether a particular facial challenge 
will or ought to succeed. To this question, there are at least three possible 
 
277. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
278. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 909. 
279. See id. at 930 (observing that severing arguably “would stray over the line from 
judicial narrowing to judicial rewriting of a challenged statute”). 
280. 546 U.S. at 331. 
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answers, any one of which might be appropriate depending on the facts of a 
particular case. The first is yes; the second is no. The third, more complex 
answer is that a facial challenge is premature or not yet ripe for decision at the 
time when it initially comes before a court.
282 Although the Supreme Court 
formally invokes ripeness doctrine only relatively rarely, many of its decisions 
rejecting facial challenges reflect ripeness-related concerns. 
In order to rule on a facial attack on the merits, a court must first 
construe, or specify the meaning of, a statute.
283 It must then apply a test of 
constitutional validity that may, sometimes, require an assessment of a 
challenged statute’s practical effects. With regard to both of these analyses, a 
court may sometimes doubt its capacity to judge wisely in the absence of a 
richer factual record than it has before it. In United Public Workers v. 
Mitchell, for example, the Court appears to have concluded that it could not 
properly interpret a federal statute barring civil service employees from 
“tak[ing] any active part in political management or political campaigns” 
without anticipating myriad, possibly unforeseeable fact situations to which 
that language arguably might or might not apply.
284 It accordingly dismissed a 
facial challenge on the ground that most of the allegations in the complaint 
failed to present a justiciable case or controversy. 
Comparable difficulties in anticipating a statute’s effects have led the 
Court to dismiss facial challenges in a number of recent cases. A doctrinal test 
used to gauge the permissibility of state regulations of electoral processes turns 
on the severity of the burdens that a challenged statute creates.
285 In Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Board,
286 involving a state law that required would-
be voters to present government-issued photo identification, the plurality 
opinion rejected a facial challenge based on uncertainty about how burdensome 
the requirement would prove in practice and remitted plaintiffs to bringing as-
applied challenges.
287 The “undue burden” standard that the Court now uses to 
determine whether restrictions on access to abortion violate the Constitution 
 
282. On the connection between facial challenges and ripeness doctrine, see, for example, 
Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 46, at 35; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1663-65. 
283. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (“[T]he first step in overbreadth analysis is to 
construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far 
without first knowing what the statute covers.”)); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 
491, 504 (1985) (recognizing that the propriety of facial invalidation depended on a prior question 
of statutory construction); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 n.16 (1973) (“[A] federal 
court must determine what a state statute means before it can judge its facial constitutionality.”). 
284. 330 U.S. 75, 78 (1947) (internal quotation omitted). 
285. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451–52 
(2008) (explaining that “[e]lection regulations that impose a severe burden on associational rights 
are subject to strict scrutiny” whereas “[i]f a statute imposes only modest burdens . . . then ‘the 
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions’”) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).  
286. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
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demands similar calculations of practical effects. Applying that standard in 
Gonzales v. Carhart,
288 Justice Kennedy rebuffed a facial challenge based on 
uncertainty about whether a statutory ban on so-called “partial-birth abortions” 
would ever have the effect of barring a procedure that was truly medically 
necessary to preserve the health of a mother.
289 Challenges to the statute could 
only be addressed on an as-applied basis, the Court thus ruled.
290 
Apparently mindful of difficulties such as those exhibited in United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, Crawford, and Carhart, Justice Souter’s 
“afterword” in Sabri v. United States advanced the general, disapproving 
observation that “facial adjudication carries too much promise of ‘premature 
interpretatio[n] of statutes’ on the basis of factually barebones records.”
291 In 
response to this concern, Justice Souter offered the prescriptions that “facial 
challenges are best when infrequent,”
292 that they are “to be discouraged,”
293 
and that the Court does and should allow statutes to be tested on their faces for 
“overbreadth” only in narrowly delimited categories of cases, especially 
including those arising under the First Amendment.
294 
Two problems infect this purported restatement of the applicable law. 
First, difficulties of “premature adjudication” based on “factually barebones 
records” can arise in First Amendment cases just as much as in those involving 
other constitutional provisions.
295 Indeed, a sampling of Supreme Court cases 
suggests that the problem is actually much more likely to arise with respect to 
statutes that regulate speech or expressive conduct than with those, for 
example, that classify on the basis of race or gender, or that discriminate 
against interstate commerce. The meaning and application of statutes in the 
second category are usually plain.
296 By contrast, identifying the precisely 
intended bounds of a regulation of speech or expressive conduct can often pose 
problems, as was the case, for example, in United Public Workers v. 
Mitchell.
297 Second, many more tests than Justice Souter imagines—
occasionally including even the rational basis test—will sometimes yield the 
conclusion that statutes are invalid on their faces because of overbreadth. 
A more appropriate response to problems that would arise from premature 
adjudication of statutes’ validity on their faces will often lie in ripeness 
 
288. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
289. See id. at 161–67. 
290. See id. at 167–68. 
291. 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). 
292. Id. at 608. 
293. Id. at 609. 
294. See id. at 610. 
295. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 87–91 (1947) (holding that 
plaintiffs asserting only vague and general plans to violate a statute alleged to abridge their First 
Amendment rights had failed to establish a justiciable case or controversy). 
296. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) (“[S]tate 
statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down.”). 
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doctrine.
298 As the Supreme Court regularly affirms in cases that it 
characterizes as involving ripeness issues, a determination of ripeness requires 
a court “to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”
299 Among the 
reasons that it would be preferable for the Court to respond to worries about 
“premature” facial challenges by invoking ripeness doctrine is that such an 
approach would make clear that the considerations that mandate the dismissal 
of a particular case are not endemic to all facial challenges. In addition, the 
well-established ripeness test would provoke an express weighing of sometimes 
competing concerns. 
With regard to the pattern of results in facial challenge cases in which the 
Court has exhibited concerns about prematurity or the inadequacy of the record, 
three comments may be in order. 
First, decisions about prematurity or ripeness are often closely bound up 
with views about the requisite showing that a challenger must make to establish 
a constitutional violation. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, for 
example, three Justices thought the facts clear enough under applicable law to 
sustain a facial challenge,
300 while three other Justices, given their different 
understanding of the Constitution, would have found the challenged voter-
identification requirement valid in all applications.
301 Only Justice Stevens, the 
author of the plurality opinion, along with the Chief Justice and Justice 
Kennedy, had what I would describe as ripeness-type concerns, involving fact-
based uncertainty concerning how many would-be voters the identification 
requirement might burden, and with what degree of severity, in its application. 
The dispute in Gonzales v. Carhart about whether the plaintiffs deserved 
to succeed with a facial challenge or should instead be relegated to as-applied 
litigation also reflected a substantive constitutional disagreement, this one 
involving the meaning of the “undue burden” standard under which abortion re-
gulations are tested. Justice Kennedy thought that establishing an undue burden 
required identifying at least a substantial number of actual cases in which the 
prohibition of an abortion technique posed a health risk to the mother.
302 Based 
on this assessment of the law, he concluded that the challengers had not made 
an adequate showing, even though he reserved the possibility that the requisite 
proofs might possibly be established in some future cases.
303 By contrast, the 
dissenting Justices thought a showing that a statute imposed an undue burden 
on the abortion right in any cases necessarily established that the statute failed 
 
298. For a survey of leading ripeness cases and a discussion of leading theories, see 
generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 198–222. 
299. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). 
300. See 553 U.S. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 237 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
301. See id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, Alito, JJ.). 
302. See 550 U.S. 124, 164–68 (2007). 
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the “undue burden” test on its face: “The very purpose of [requiring] a health 
exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.”
304 
Second, in cases in which the Supreme Court rejects a facial challenge 
based on inadequacies in the record that the plaintiffs have put before it, the 
significance of its decision should lie in the reasons for its ruling. What the 
Court meant, or ought to have meant, in cases such as Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Board and Gonzales v. Carhart was not that the challenged 
statutes demonstrably satisfied all applicable tests of constitutional validity, but 
that the particular parties before the Court had not presented a factual record on 
which the Court, as informed only by that record, could hold the challenged 
statutes facially unconstitutional. Rejection of a facial challenge on this basis 
should not foreclose future facial challenges that the doctrines of claim and 
issue preclusion do not otherwise bar.
305 If the Court had explicitly rested its 
holdings on ripeness grounds, as would have been preferable, these 
implications would be clear. 
Third, insofar as the Court is troubled by ripeness-type concerns about 
premature litigation, a crucial distinction exists between suits for anticipatory 
relief against the future enforcement of statutes—typically in the form of 
injunctions or declaratory judgments–—and cases in which the challengers 
appear as defendants in enforcement actions. A party against whom a statute is 
being enforced coercively is always entitled to argue that the statute is 
invalid.
306 If an as-applied challenge fails, or if the record fails to support one, a 
court cannot simply refuse to address a facial challenge that offers a defendant 
her last chance to argue that the statute being enforced against her is 
constitutionally invalid. Sabri was a case of this kind.
307 Possibly because it so 
recognized, the Court thus rejected a criminal defendant’s facial challenge on 
the merits
308 before issuing its “afterword” concerning facial challenges’ 
appropriate rarity. 
CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS WITH FACIAL CHALLENGES AND THE COURT’S 
RESPONSE 
With previous Parts having shown that the Supreme Court does not 
categorically disfavor facial challenges, and that few if any transsubstantive 
rules apply rigidly to determine when facial challenges will succeed, it may be 
 
304. 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
305. Cf. Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 1664–65 (making a similar point about the 
Court’s rejection of a facial challenge in Washington State Grange). 
306. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 46, at 28. 
307. Sabri, who was indicted under a federal statute proscribing bribery of state, local, and 
tribal officials of entities that receive over $10,000 in federal funds, moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the ground that the statute he was accused of violating was unconstitutional on its 
face. See 541 U.S. 600, 603 (2004). The case came to the Supreme Court after the district court 
agreed and granted Sabri’s motion and the court of appeals reversed. See id. at 604. 
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helpful, by way of conclusion, to explore why this state of affairs exists. One 
reason is conceptual. As Part I explained, all challenges to statutes begin as as-
applied challenges, with the distinguishing mark of facial challenges involving 
the nature and breadth of the reasons that challengers offer in seeking a ruling 
that a statute cannot validly be applied. With the distinction between as-applied 
and facial challenges being less fundamental than courts and commentators 
have often assumed, it should occasion no surprise that the Supreme Court does 
not always labor self-consciously to draw that distinction, nor treat all 
challenges that could be described as facial as peculiarly dispreferred. 
A second reason why so few categorical rules govern facial challenges is 
more normative. It emerges if we ask why anyone might think—as the 
Supreme Court has often, but misleadingly, asserted—that the Court should 
almost categorically disapprove facial challenges. To state the answer at the 
outset, there is no good reason why facial challenges should be disfavored 
categorically, though there are often good reasons why facial challenges should 
not succeed in particular cases. Better than any other generalization, that banal 
proposition explains the Supreme Court’s patterns of decision. 
A brief examination of three possible reasons for thinking that facial 
challenges ought almost always to be disfavored will illustrate the point. First, 
the Supreme Court has often proclaimed that it, like all courts, is bound by two 
rules, to which it has rigidly adhered: “[o]ne, never to anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other, never to 
formulate a rule of law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it 
is to be applied.”
309 As argued above, this asserted precept sometimes offers 
wise counsel, but is wholly unsupportable as an unyielding rule. It is the 
Court’s function sometimes to resolve uncertainty and to ensure effective 
constitutional implementation by laying down broad, clear rules or tests that 
may have the effect of establishing not just that a particular statute is 
unconstitutional in all applications, but that many others are, too. Under these 
circumstances, it should surprise no one that the Court fails to live consistently 
by the dicta that it will never anticipate a question not strictly before it, nor 
formulate a broader rule than the facts of the case require. Indeed, these dicta 
seem self-refuting insofar as they prescribe general rules of judicial conduct 
that reach beyond the facts of any case in which the Court may utter them. 
Second, a categorical dispreference for facial challenges might stand on 
the grounds that courts should defer to legislatures except in cases of clear 
 
309. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (quoting United States v. 
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of 
Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))). See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (“Facial challenges . . . run contrary to the fundamental principle of 
judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of 
the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by 
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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constitutional mistake
310 and that truly clear constitutional mistakes are most 
likely to emerge, if at all, from legislatures’ inability to foresee the 
consequences of applying statutes to unanticipated cases.
311 The weakness of 
this argument lies in the premise that courts should not hold statutes 
unconstitutional—regardless of whether on an as-applied or a facial basis—
except in cases of clear constitutional mistake. This is not the place for a deep 
discussion of that Thayerian precept’s normative merits.
312 Suffice it to say that 
the Supreme Court has long since refused to abide by it on a consistent basis
313 
and that few if any modern commentators defend Thayerianism across the 
board.
314 Stripped of the Thayerian premise, the claim that courts function best 
when invalidating legislation as applied to problematical cases that the 
legislature did not foresee shows why the courts should engage in as-applied 
adjudication, even when they would uphold the statutes in issue against facial 
challenges.
315 But without the Thayerian premise, a recognition that as-applied 
challenges are important and appropriate within our constitutional scheme does 
not imply that facial challenges should be categorically suspect. Sometimes—
as, for example, in Brown v. Board of Education
316—facial challenges may be 
necessary to implement constitutional norms effectively. Once again, no 
general rule is possible. Contextual considerations matter. 
Third, the Supreme Court sometimes says that facial challenges should be 
rare because of the special difficulties that overbreadth claims present.
317 But 
not all facial challenges depend on determinations of overbreadth. For example, 
statutes can be facially invalid because they have forbidden purposes; or violate 
the plain text of Article I; or display forbidden favoritism by banning some, but 
not other, speech. What is more, although some overbreadth claims require 
difficult and arguably premature interpretation on a barebones record, others do 
not. Many of the First Amendment cases cited in Part III exhibited no difficulty 
on this score.
318 In my view, many cases challenging race- and gender-based 
 
310. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135 (1893). 
311. See Edward Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial 
Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1745–48, 1751–
52 (2006). 
312. See Thayer, supra note 310, at 135 (defending the premise that courts should 
invalidate legislation only in cases of clear constitutional mistake). 
313. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 311, at 1737; Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 
1994 Term–Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 53–54 (2005). 
314. For a rare defense of a generally Thayerian approach to judicial review, see ADRIAN 
VERMEULE,  JUDGING  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY:  AN  INSTITUTIONAL  THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION (2006). 
315. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 70 (observing that Congress, in enacting 
legislation, generally does not and could not determine that it would be constitutionally valid in all 
possible applications). 
316. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
317. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). 
318. See, e.g., Board. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987) 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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classification also present overbreadth claims, rooted in the premise that race- 
and gender-based generalizations are too impermissibly overbroad to be used 
for some purposes.
319 Rightly, the Court has not hesitated to adjudicate the 
facial constitutionality of discriminatory statutes. In any event, efforts to derive 
general prohibitions against facial challenges from the subcategory of 
overbreadth challenges that impose excessive burdens on the courts’ practical 
competence are, in a word, overbroad. 
When one surveys the doctrinal landscape in light of this short review of 
possible reasons for skepticism of facial challenges, one thus sees roughly what 
one would expect to see, with one significant exception. As one would expect, 
facial challenges are not categorically disfavored; they often succeed. As one 
also would expect, when facial challenges pose special difficulties, the 
Supreme Court typically rejects them, on one basis or another. The one surprise 
is that when the Court rejects a particular facial challenge, it sometimes 
includes broad, seemingly categorical denunciations of facial challenges as a 
class, possibly tempered by a few narrowly stated exceptions. Remarkably, 
these denunciations have shaped the conventional wisdom about the 
availability of facial challenges. The errors of that conventional wisdom should 
now be plain. 
APPENDIX 
In order to count facial and as-applied challenges and compare their 
success rates, my research assistants and I obviously needed to identify which 
of the cases that the Supreme Court decided during that 2009, 2004, 1999, 
1994, 1989 and 1984 Terms fell into either one category or the other. In doing 
so, we confronted a number of difficulties, some of which we had anticipated 
and others of which we had not. Some of these difficulties involved conceptual 
and practical obstacles to maintaining crisp distinctions among facial 
challenges, as-applied challenges, and other kinds of typically ad hoc 
constitutional challenges to actions by lower court judges or government 
officials. Others required methodological decisions about how to tally success 
rates that others might make differently. After explaining our coding and 
methodological decisions in general terms, this Appendix provides 
documentation for the numerical findings reported in the text by listing, in 
footnotes on a Term-by-Term basis, all of the cases that we coded as falling 
within the various categories for which we recorded findings. 
 
(invalidating a ban on all “First Amendment activities” at Los Angeles International Airport); 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (invalidating a Florida statute that required 
newspapers to print replies by candidates whose characters or records they attacked). 
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A. Conceptual and Practical Challenges 
As emphasized above, the conceptual distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges is overdrawn and potentially misleading: although facial 
challenges are narrowly and sharply defined, the category of as-applied 
challenges encompasses both claims that a statute is invalid as applied only to a 
particular case and claims that a statute, although not invalid in toto, is 
unconstitutional in many or even most of its intended applications. 
Examination of all of the Supreme Court’s cases from selected Terms reveals 
further conceptual and practical difficulties in determining whether the Court—
regardless of what the parties argued—actually addressed and decided claims 
that a statute, rule, or policy was invalid on its face.
320  
First, apart from statutes enacted by Congress and state legislatures, it is 
not always self-evident what kinds of rules and policies could in principle be 
subject to facial and as-applied challenges. For this purpose, we opted to 
include written but not unwritten rules and policies adopted by nonjudicial 
government entities.
321 We also included state common law rules when the 
Court appeared to understand them as having a clear content susceptible of 
either facial or as-applied challenge.
322 
Second, in cases in which the Supreme Court rules on constitutional 
claims, it is frequently not obvious whether the claimant questions the validity 
of a legal rule or policy—either on its face or as applied—at all. Many Court 
decisions address the constitutionality of actions by lower court judges, such as 
rulings on motions at trials, or by governmental officials, such as searches and 
seizures, that may be authorized, but are not mandated, by statute. As a result, 
the sorting of constitutional challenges into either the category of a facial or an 
as-applied challenge sometimes requires difficult, potentially contestable deter-
minations of whether the validity of a statute or rule is at issue in any way.
323 
 
320. The Supreme Court faced partly analogous problems of classification under versions 
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254 and 1257 that, prior to their amendment in 1988, see Supreme Court Case 
Selections Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988), vested it with 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over certain cases in which the “validity” of “a statute” was 
“drawn in question.” For discussion of the Court’s efforts to resolve those problems, see PAUL M. 
BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 711–24 
(3d ed. 1988).  
321. Although written rules and policies that are adopted by nonelected bodies—such as 
administrative agencies and state universities—are as amenable to facial challenges as the 
enactments of Congress and state legislatures, we excluded challenges to unwritten policies, such 
as the policy of the California Department of Corrections of racially segregating new inmates in 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). We also excluded the challenge in Smith v. Robbins, 
528 U.S. 259 (2000), to a procedure for review of lawyers’ motions for leave to withdraw from 
indigents’ cases that was established by judicial opinion. But we included the challenge to a 
highway sobriety checkpoint “program” in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990), because it was administered pursuant to written guidelines to which the Court called 
attention.  
322. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265, 268–69 (1990). 
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Third, even in cases that clearly involve the application of a rule or policy, 
the Court frequently gives no explicit indication whether it understands itself as 
rendering a ruling on the validity of the statute on its face or only as applied. 
Absent explicit indications from the Court, we did our best to determine 
whether the Court’s analysis implied that it was concerned with the facial 
validity of a statute or only with whether the statute was constitutional as 
applied. In some cases, however, others might have made different judgments. 
The one conclusion on which all should concur is that the Court does not 
always sort the cases and issues before it into clearly demarcated categories of 
facial and as-applied analysis. 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, even in cases in which the Court 
relatively consistently employs the characteristic nomenclature of facial 
analysis, it is sometimes doubtful whether its signals should be taken at face 
value.  American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service 
Commission
324 will suffice to illustrate the difficulty. There, truckers who 
engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce brought a dormant 
commerce clause challenge against a state statute imposing a flat one hundred 
dollar fee on trucks that did any intrastate hauling at all on the ground that it 
impermissibly burdened those truckers that also operated interstate. Although 
the logic of the challengers’ theory, if accepted, would not necessarily have 
entailed the statute’s invalidity as applied to purely intrastate truckers, the 
Court’s opinion—which rejected that theory—referred throughout to 
challenges to “the statute” and “the fee” as if it conceived the challenge as a 
facial one. In cases such as this, we tried to base our categorization on the 
 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), convicted criminals maintained that their sentences for crimes 
committed while they were juveniles—life in prison without parole in Graham, death in Roper—
constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. In both cases, 
state statutes authorized, but did not flatly require, the sentences. The cases, accordingly, could be 
construed either as presenting as-applied challenges to the state statutory schemes insofar as they 
authorized the sentences in issue or as involving as-applied attacks on the sentence alone. In the 
cases that could plausibly have been categorized as either challenging a statute, on the one hand, 
or the discretionary actions of government officials, on the other hand, my research assistants and 
I tried to track the Court’s approach and to treat challenges as addressed to the background 
statutes if, but only if, the Court so framed its analysis. Because the Court in Graham and Roper 
specifically referred not only to relevant state statutes, but also to the statutes in other states that 
would have permitted similar sentences, we coded the cases as involving as-applied challenges to 
the statutes. We did the same with Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), which appeared 
to treat a constitutional objection to the admission of evidence as an as-applied challenge to Rule 
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. By contrast, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 
545 U.S. 850 (2005), in which officials erected Ten Commandments displays before the 
enactment of an authorizing resolution and subsequently altered those displays in response to a 
judicial ruling, we treated the challenge as addressed to officials’ conduct rather than a law, 
ordinance, or resolution. We made similar judgments in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 
U.S. 182 (1990), which rejected a First Amendment-based challenge to a subpoena issued in 
connection with a statutorily authorized EEOC investigation, and California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 
490 (1990), which held an order by the California Water Resources Control Board to be 
preempted by federal law. 
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predominant thrust of the Court’s reasoning, but with some attention, too, to 
clear implications. Because the Court’s reasoning in American Trucking would 
appear to preclude the success of as-applied as well as facial challenges in a 
future case, we classified it as having entertained, and rejected, both facial and 
as-applied challenges. 
If the American Trucking Court had ruled for the challengers, however, 
classification of its ruling would have presented an even more difficult 
challenge. Much of the Court’s language characterizing the issue before it 
would have suggested that it had sustained a facial attack. As noted above, 
however, the logic of a ruling that a statute impermissibly burdened interstate 
commerce would not necessarily have extended to a case applying the 
challenged fee to trucks operating solely in intrastate commerce. In cases of 
this kind—in which the Court appeared to speak globally, but we could 
imagine ways in which a future Court might distinguish some possible cases 
involving other parties—we took the Court at its apparent word and treated the 
Court as having held the statute invalid on its face.
325 But this decision was not 
obviously correct. 
B. Methodological Choices 
Perhaps our most important methodological choice was whether to count 
the facial or as-applied challenges that the parties presented, on the one hand, 
or those that the Court actually adjudicated on the merits, on the other hand. 
For nearly every purpose, we determined that the latter is the more important 
number, and our tallies reflect this conclusion. We thus excluded from our 
count cases that the Court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, including lack 
of standing or mootness.
326 We took the same approach to cases in which one 
 
325. We similarly coded Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), in which the Court characterized its holding as 
finding that “program[s]” providing assistance to private schools violated the Establishment 
Clause, due to their effects in promoting religion or entangling the government with religious 
institutions, as involving facial invalidations, even though in both cases a relatively small fraction 
of the assistance went to nonreligious schools. If the defendants in Ball and Aguilar had continued 
to make distributions under their programs to nonreligious schools only, they might plausibly have 
argued that the Court’s rationale showed those programs to be unconstitutional only as applied to 
religious schools, any broader language in the Court’s opinion notwithstanding. Another 
exemplification of the same classificatory problem comes from cases that appear to hold statutes 
invalid because not “congruent and proportional” to an identified pattern of constitutional 
violations under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a future case brought under such a 
statute, but by a plaintiff who had herself pleaded that she was the victim of an actual 
constitutional violation, it is at least imaginable that the Court would say, as it did in United States 
v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006), that “no one doubts” Congress’s power to abrogate states’ 
immunity for violations of constitutional rights. 
326. Our reasoning was that dispositions such as these leave the Court with no occasion to 
determine whether to entertain, disprefer, or uphold a facial challenge. We included in this 
category cases in which the votes of Justices finding a lack of justiciability were necessary to 
make a majority for the Court’s decision, even if some of the Justices in the majority would have 
decided the case on the merits. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). But we did not 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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of the parties challenged the validity of a statute, either on its face or as applied, 
but in which the Court, although laying out a test or standard for a lower court 
to apply on remand, did not resolve the challenge itself.
327   
A perhaps more debatable application of the decision to count only 
adjudications of challenges, not total challenges presented by the parties, 
involved cases in which the parties addressed constitutional challenges to 
statutes, either on their faces or as-applied, but the Court obviated those 
challenges by ruling for the challengers on statutory, rather than constitutional, 
grounds—sometimes, but not always, by invoking the avoidance canon.
328 
Because the Court did not make any constitutional ruling on the merits, we 
decided to exclude such cases from our count of successful and unsuccessful 
facial and as-applied challenges. But the exclusion did not come without cost.  
By omitting cases in which the Court at the very least did not reject the 
possibility that statutes might have been vulnerable to facial attack but for its 
statutory interpretation, our count risks understating the Court’s openness to 
facial challenges in practice. 
Some cases present a variety of facial or as-applied challenges, or both, 
under multiple constitutional provisions.
329 In order to avoid artificial inflation 
of the number of facial challenges relative to cases decided, our tally records 
cases in which the Court has entertained and either upheld or rejected facial 
and as-applied challenges. In other words, if the Court upheld at least one facial 
challenge in a case, we list the case as one in which a facial challenge 
succeeded, and ignore the rejection of other facial challenges in the same 
case,
330 even if the rejected challenges involved distinct statutory provisions.
331 
The one exception to this general rule involves cases in which the Court sepa-
rately addressed a facial and an as-applied challenge. In tallying the success 
rates for facial and as-applied challenges, we have separately counted the 
Court’s rulings on distinct facial and as-applied challenges within a single case. 
 
 
include in this category—which is to say that we treated as having resolved a facial challenge on 
the merits—City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282–83 (2000), in which two concurring 
Justices first explained that they regarded the case as moot, but then went on to explain that, if the 
case were not moot, they, like the plurality, would have rejected the facial challenge at issue on 
the merits. See id. at 307 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
327. E.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  
328. E.g., Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 25–26 (2005); Jones v. United States, 
529 U.S. 848, 857–58 (2000). 
329. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 59, 64–65 (1989) (rejecting 
separate facial challenges under the Constitution’s just compensation, due process, and equal 
protection guarantees). 
330. For example, we list FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), as a case in 
which the Court upheld a facial challenge (under the Free Speech Clause), id. at 229–30, and 
essentially ignore the Court’s rejection in the same case of facial challenges under the Due Process 
Clause and freedom of association doctrine, id. at 236–37. 
331. For an example, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990). 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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A final puzzle arose from the quite different postures in which questions 
about statutes’ facial validity can come before the Supreme Court on appeal. A 
challenger may press a facial challenge that failed in a lower court, or the Court 
may review a lower court decision that pronounced a statute unconstitutional 
on its face.
332 Although the resulting differences in the framing of claims of 
facial invalidity may sometimes influence the Court’s analysis, I have grouped 
all cases in which the Court addressed facial challenges into one category and 
have recorded the Court’s rulings as either upholding or rejecting facial 
challenges. 
C. Term-by-Term Categorizations of Cases 
The following Term-by-Term reports of the cases that we assigned to 
various categories should assist anyone who might want to reexamine or 
contest the coding and counting decisions that underlie the numerical results 
reported in the text. 
2009 Term: Out of an overall total of eighty-seven cases,
333 the Court ruled 
on facial challenges in six cases
334 and on as-applied challenges in four cases.
335 
Of the six facial challenges that the Court entertained, three succeeded on the 
merits.
336 Of the four as-applied challenges, one succeeded on the merits.
337 
 
332. For cautions about the significance of such pronouncements in some cases, see supra 
note 31 and accompanying text. 
333. The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2010). 
334. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010); United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582 (2010); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147–49, 3161 (2010); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010); 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010); Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 
1195, 1199–1200 (2010). Of these, two required significant coding judgments. Florida v. Powell 
presented the question whether a police officer had given an adequate Miranda warning by 
reading from “the standard Tampa Police Department Consent and Release Form 310.” Id. at 
1200. We coded the case as presenting a facial challenge to the form. In Christian Legal Society, 
in which the plaintiff challenged a public law school’s policy of barring discriminatory student 
groups from receiving school funding, the Court held that a stipulation by the parties concerning 
the nature of the school’s policy barred the plaintiff from making arguments about the school’s 
“policy as written” insofar as those arguments contradicted the parties’ earlier stipulations. 130 S. 
Ct. at 2982–84. Because the relevant stipulation addressed the general content of the school’s 
nondiscrimination policy, and not the peculiarities of its application to the Christian Legal Society, 
we classified the challenge as one to the policy on its face. 
335. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815–17 (2010); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 
1339–41 (2010); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18, 2022–23 (2010). Although the 
Court said in Doe v. Reed that the plaintiffs’ challenge needed to satisfy the standards applicable 
to facial challenges because they maintained that the Washington Public Records Act “reach[ed] 
beyond the[ir] particular circumstances,” 130 S. Ct. at 2817, the First Amendment test that the 
Court applied, if satisfied, would have established that the statute was invalid insofar, but only 
insofar, as it mandated the disclosure of petitions to have referenda placed on the ballot. We 
therefore coded the case as presenting an as-applied rather than a facial challenge. 
336. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592; Free Enter. Fund, 130 
S. Ct. at 3147–48, 3164 (2010).  
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2004 Term: Out of a total of seventy-nine cases,
338 the Court decided five 
cases presenting facial challenges only,
339 three cases presenting as-applied 
challenges only,
340 and three cases in which the Court failed to distinguish 
clearly, but its reasoning can be construed as applicable to both.
341 Of the 
overall total of eight facial challenges that the Court entertained, two succeeded 
on the merits.
342 Of the overall total of six as-applied challenges, two succeeded 
on the merits.
343 
1999 Term: Out of a total of seventy-seven cases,
344 the Court ruled on 
facial challenges in twenty cases
345 and on as-applied challenges in seven 
cases.
346 Of the twenty facial challenges, twelve succeeded on the merits.
347 Of 
the seven as-applied challenges, five succeeded.
348 
 
338. The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420 (2005). 
339. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 447–48, 459 (2005); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 
493 (2005); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14; Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220–
21 (2005); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). 
340. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 567 (2005); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 564, 568 (2005); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2005). 
341. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27, 229 n.1 (2005); Clingman v. Beaver, 
544 U.S. 581, 585 (2005); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Service Comm’n 545 U.S. 
429, 431–34 (2005). 
342. Booker, 543 U.S. at 224 (only to the extent that the Sentencing Guidelines conflict 
with the Apprendi line of cases); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466. 
343. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79; Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27, 229 n.1. 
344. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390 (2000).    
345. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000); Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 383 (2000); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of 
Cal., 528 U.S. 458, 463 (2000); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498–99 (2000); United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000); City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 282–83 (2000); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex 
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–78 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 806–07 (2000); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 331 (2000); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468–69 (2000); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 
567, 569 (2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707–08 (2000); Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914, 921–22 (2000); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000); Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).  
346. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 347 (2000); Ohler v. United States, 529 
U.S. 753, 759–60 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000); Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643–44 (2000); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 
(2000); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 516 (2000). We also included in this category Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), in which the plurality opinion held a statute invalid as applied, id. 
at 75, even though two concurring opinions would have found it facially invalid, see id. at 75–76 
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
347. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67; Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 528 U.S. at 463; Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 
498–99; Locke, 529 U.S. at 94; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02; Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 
806–07; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366; Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497; Cal. 
Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 586; Sternberg, 530 U.S. at 921–22; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 
530 U.S. at 317. 
348. Norfolk S. Ry., 529 U.S. at 347; Geier, 529 U.S. at 864–65; Boy Scouts of Am., 530 
U.S. at 644 ; Carmell, 529 U.S. at 552; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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1994 Term: Out of a total of eighty-six cases,
349 the Court decided ten cases 
presenting facial challenges only,
350 six cases presenting as-applied challenges 
only,
351 and one case presenting both.
352 Of the eleven total facial challenges, 
seven succeeded.
353 Of the seven total as-applied challenges, four succeeded.
354 
1989 Term: Out of a total of 139 cases,
355 the Court decided seventeen 
cases presenting facial challenges,
356 fourteen presenting as-applied 
challenges,
357 and five presenting both.
358 Of the twenty-two total facial 
 
349. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term—The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1995). 
350. United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 66–67, 78–79 (1994); Harris v. 
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 511, 515 (1995); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 
(1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 339, 356 (1995); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995); 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 
U.S. 618, 621, 635 (1995); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1995); Miller 
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920–27 (1995). 
351. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109 (1994); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. 
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–79 (1995); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 
178 (1995); Cal. Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995); Reynoldsville Casket 
Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 751–52, 759 (1995); Hurley v. Irish-American, Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995). 
352. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822–23, 827–28 
(1995). 
353. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356–57; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 480, 491; 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783; Rosenberger., 515 U.S. at 837; Miller, 
515 U.S.at 920–27. 
354. Reich, 513 U.S. at 108; Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 751–52, 759; Hurley, 515 
U.S. at 578–79; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837. 
355. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term—The Statistics, 104 HARV. L. REV. 359 (1990).   
356. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 54 (1989); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 
493 U.S. 215, 220, 223 (1990); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 
333–34 (1990); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 4–5, 17 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 213–18 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 372 (1990); McKoy v. North Carolina, 
494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990); U.S. Dep’t. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 717 (1990); United 
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387–88 (1990); North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 
423, 426 (1990); Westside Cmty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 231 (1990); Perpich v. 
Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1990); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 
447 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422–23 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1990); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 
(1990); and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990) (ruling only on a facial challenge, while 
remanding for a decision on an as-applied challenge). See id. at 860.  
357. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 380 (1990); 
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 414 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 
U.S. 299, 301, 305–06 (1990); Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990); Adams Fruit Co. 
v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 640 (1990); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 364–72, 376 (1990); English v. General Elec. Co., 
496 U.S. 72, 74 (1990); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 
91, 93–94, 97–98 (1990); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990); Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 39 (1990); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 722–23 (1990); 
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 343–44 (1990); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 
U.S. 261, 265, 268–69 (1990). 
358. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990); Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 106–08 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 642–44, 647–53, 655 
(1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 766 (1990); and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 01 Fallon.doc (Do Not Delete)  7/5/2011  8:44 PM 
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challenges, four succeeded.
359 Of the nineteen total as-applied challenges, 
five succeeded.
360 
1984 Term: Out of a total of 151 cases,
361 the Court ruled on eighteen 
cases presenting facial challenges,
362 on nine cases presenting as-applied 
challenges,
363 and on four cases presenting both.
364 Of the twenty-two total 
facial challenges, eleven succeeded.
365 Of the thirteen as-applied challenges, 
four succeeded.
366 
 
312 (1990). In Eichman, the Court initially characterized the issue before it as presenting an as-
applied challenge, see 496 U.S. at 312, but then spoke about the constitutionality of the statute in 
light of the validity of the government’s reasons for enacting it. See id. at 315–318. 
359. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 223; McKoy, 494 U.S. at 435; Eichman, 496 U.S. at 312; 
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 422–23. 
360. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 626; Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 649; Rawson, 495 U.S. at 376; 
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 122–26; Peel, 496 U.S. at 111. 
361. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term—The Statistics, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1985). 
362. Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 259–60 (1985); Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 478 (1985); Fed. 
Elections Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 482–84 (1985); United States v. 
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 91, 103 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–33 (1985); Ponte v. 
Real, 471 U.S. 491, 492–93 (1985); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 
710–12 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 16, 27 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 
56–61 (1985); Ne. Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174–78 (1985); 
Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 615, 617, 622 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. 
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708–10 (1985); Walters v. Nat. Ass’n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 
U.S. 305, 307–08 (1985); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–94 
(1985); Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985); Cornelius v. NAACP (NAACP III), 
473 U.S. 788, 795–97 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380–81, 397–98 
(1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 407–08, 414 (1985). 
363. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 533–36 (1985); Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 872 (1985); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5, 11–12 
(1985); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 294, 303 (1985); Burger 
King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470 (1985); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 481–82, 485 
(1985); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502–07 (1985); United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 679 (1985); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
447–50 (1985). 
364. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 536 (1985); Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 604–06, 610–11 (1985); Zaunderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626, 635 (1985); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382–86 & n.8 (1985). 
365. Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985); FEC v. 
Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 482–84 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–
33 (1985); Zaunderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642, 647–49 (1985); 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 16, 27 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56–61 (1985); 
Hooper, 472 U.S. at 615–17, 622–23; Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 708–10; Piper, 470 U.S. at 
288 ; Grand Rapids Sch. Dist., 473 U.S. at 380–81, 397–98; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 407–08, 414. 
366. Metro. Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 872; Garner, 471 U.S. at 5, 11–12; Spokane Arcades, 472 
U.S. at 502–07; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437. 